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LEGAL ENTITIES AS TRANSFERABLE
BUNDLES OF CONTRACTS
Kenneth Ayotte*
Henry Hansmann**
The large, modern business corporation is frequently organized as a com-
plex cluster of hundreds of corporate subsidiaries under the common
control of a single corporate parent. Our Article provides new theory and
supportive evidence to help explain this structure. We focus, in particular
on the advantages of subsidiary entities in providing the option to transfer
some or all of the firm's contractual rights and obligations in the future.
The theory not only sheds light on corporate subsidiaries but also illumi-
nates a basic function of all types of legal entities, from partnerships to
nonprofit corporations.
We show that when, as is common, some of a firm's key assets are contrac-
tual, both the firm's owner(s) and its contractual counterparties are
exposed to the risk of opportunism relating to the assignment of the con-
tracts. The owner faces opportunistic holdup by counterparties if
counterparty consent is required to assign contracts in a sale of the entire
firm. The firm's counterparties, in turn, are exposed to opportunistic as-
signment if the owner can freely assign contracts without consent. This
bilateral opportunism problem can be mitigated through bundled assigna-
bility: the owner is permitted to assign her contracts freely but only as a
bundle. The components of the bundle of contracts (which constitute much
of the firm itself) provide assurance of performance to counterparties. And
free transferability, in turn, gives the owner liquidity without risk of
holdup. Most importantly-and least appreciated in the literature and the
case law-bundled assignability increases the owner's incentive to make
valuable investments in the firm.
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We explain why legal entities provide the simplest, most reliable means of
creating bundled assignability. Further, we support our analysis with the
first empirical study of assignment clauses in commercial contracts. Firms,
we show, commonly provide for bundled assignability in their contracts,
and they use legal entities to define the boundaries of transferable bundles.
This suggests that our theoretical model accurately captures the motiva-
tions of contracting parties in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite all of the ink that has been spilled on the subject over the last
two centuries, we still lack a full understanding of the many roles played by
legal entities. To be sure, the basic structure and benefits of the most con-
spicuous type of legal entity-the publicly traded business corporation-are
generally familiar.' Less familiar, however, are corporate subsidiaries. To-
day, each of the largest 100 companies in the United States has, on average,
about 250 distinct subsidiaries that are large enough to be reported in the
firm's securities filings and presumably many more that are smaller.2 Most
of these subsidiaries are wholly owned and consequently controlled by the
parent company. Why do firms routinely adopt this structure, rather than
managing their various activities as unincorporated divisions within the par-
ent firm's corporate shell? What is the purpose of these subsidiary entities?
This question has been largely neglected in both the legal and the eco-
nomics literature. An answer is important, however, for both law and
practice. Courts and regulators must often decide whether to respect the
corporate boundaries between commonly owned subsidiaries for purposes
of accounting, veil piercing, taxation, and regulation. Bankruptcy courts
have the power to "substantively consolidate" corporate groups, merging
both the assets and the liabilities of a parent corporation's subsidiaries as if
they were simply managerial divisions within a single corporate shell. If
wholly owned subsidiaries are typically formed just for opportunistic rea-
sons, such as misleading creditors or avoiding taxation or regulation, there
may be a strong case for refusing to treat them as separate entities.
If, conversely, subsidiaries commonly serve important economic functions,
then the failure to respect the independent character of those subsidiaries
when taxing or regulating them, or when sorting out creditors' claims in
bankruptcy, comes at a price that should be taken into account.
We explore in this Article what we believe to be one important reason-
though clearly not the only reason-for organizing a set of activities as a
distinct legal entity, even when that entity is wholly owned by another entity.
Our explanation not only throws light on the role served by corporate sub-
sidiaries but also illuminates the functions served by legal entities more
generally. Our theory focuses on the great utility of legal entities in facilitat-
ing transferability, particularly when a firm's value depends greatly on its
contractual rights. Legal entities provide a low-cost means of assembling
complementary contracts into discrete bundles that can be freely transferred
1. See, e.g., John Armour et al., What Is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF COR-
PORATE LAW 5-16 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (describing the basic features
of the business corporation and their respective functions).
2. See Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
605, 606 n.1 (2011).
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to a new owner, but only if the contracts are transferred together as a bundle.
We refer to this feature as "bundled assignability."
Our theory explains why bundled assignability can be an efficient eco-
nomic configuration. Bundled assignability constrains opportunism on the
part of both the business's owner(s) and its contractual counterparties-its
suppliers, employees, and customers-that can arise when transferability is
at issue. With these opportunism problems minimized, owners have a great-
er incentive to make investments that add complementary value to the
bundle.
We also explain why legal entities are useful tools in creating bundled
assignability, and we present empirical evidence supporting our claim. In
particular, we find that bundled assignability is a common feature of com-
mercial contracts in practice, and legal entities are the predominant means
of achieving it. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide theory and
supportive empirical evidence on assignment terms in commercial contracts.
Our theory and evidence also allow us to offer perspective on bankruptcy
doctrine governing the transferability of contractual rights and obligations
and to understand some of the current features of that doctrine.
We proceed as follows: Part I discusses briefly the current legal and
economic theories of legal entities that are closest to the theory we propose
here and that this Article builds upon. Part II explores the concept of bun-
dled assignability, discussing first the ways in which bundled assignability is
facilitated by current legal doctrine through the relationship between con-
tract assignability and legal entities, followed by an intuitive sketch of our
own theory of the economic efficiencies offered by bundled assignability.
Part III, the heart of this Article, illustrates our theory with a numerical ex-
ample. Part IV shows that the central elements of the bundled assignability
theory continue to hold under a variety of plausible changes in the exam-
ple's background assumptions. Part V explores the value of legal entities in
establishing bundled assignability. Part VI presents empirical evidence on
the prevalence of bundled assignability in commercial contracts, and Part
VII discusses further implications concerning bankruptcy doctrine and intel-
lectual property rights.
I. CURRENT THEORIES OF LEGAL ENTITIES
To set the stage for our analysis, it's helpful to take a brief look at exist-
ing theories of the functions served by legal entities, particularly entities
with a single owner, such as corporate subsidiaries. We set aside entities-
and particularly subsidiaries-that are created principally to segregate assets
and activities into distinct (and usually somewhat arbitrary) pools for ease of
compliance with taxation or regulation. For example, firms operating in
multiple jurisdictions may choose to subincorporate their operations in each
jurisdiction to aid them in complying with-or taking advantage of-
differences in the tax regimes across those jurisdictions. And a company
with a captive insurance business will generally want to subincorporate that
business for the sake of segregating, from the firm's other assets, the capital
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that regulators require it to hold as a reserve to back its insurance policies.
We are interested here, instead, in the more basic economic functions served
by legal entities in facilitating coordination of activities among the principal
participants in an enterprise, namely its owners and the persons with whom
the enterprise has contractual relationships, such as its employees, suppliers,
and customers. That is, we are concerned with the utility of segregating ac-
tivities into distinct legal entities even in the absence of taxation and
regulation.
A. The Economic Theory of the Firm: Property Rights
At least since Ronald Coase's foundational 1937 article,3 economists have
sought to develop a "theory of the firm" to explain the scope and structure of
business organizations. These theories, including the currently dominant
"property rights theory of the firm," focus on potential efficiencies or ineffi-
ciencies that arise from having assets held under common control.4 These
theories are theories "of the firm" in the sense of the firm being the (ulti-
mate) common owner of assets. These theories have difficulty, however, in
explaining legal entities in general and subsidiaries in particular.
The basic logic of these theories is already familiar to many lawyers and
legal scholars. We review it here briefly to clarify the ways in which our
own theory both builds upon, and differs from, that logic.
Suppose that there are two assets (call them Asset 1 and Asset 2) that
initially are owned by two different persons (call them, respectively, Able
and Baker). Assets I and 2 must be used in combination to produce a prod-
uct. (The assets here could be anything from individual machines to whole
businesses.) The question is whether Assets 1 and 2 should remain in sepa-
rate ownership with their joint use coordinated by means of an arms-length
agreement between Able and Baker, or whether, alternatively, either Able or
Baker should purchase the other's asset and coordinate the use of the assets
by direct exercise of the rights of ownership.
Suppose that, for productive efficiency, Able must specialize Asset 1, at
a cost to her, in a fashion that will make it usable only with Asset 2.1 Then
there is an incentive for Able to own the two assets-that is, for Able to buy
Asset 2 from Baker before Asset 1 is specialized. For if they are kept in sep-
arate ownership, then after Able has borne the cost of specializing Asset 1,
Baker has both the incentive and the opportunity to "hold up" Able. In par-
ticular, Baker can threaten to withdraw Asset 2 from production unless Able
gives him further compensation, thus capturing some of the value that Able
added with the specialization investment. It follows that Able, anticipating
such opportunism, will have less incentive to invest in specializing Asset 1
3. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
4. See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Owner-
ship: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
5. It must further be assumed here that the two firms cannot write, in advance, an
enforceable contract that specifies both the investment to be made by Able and all the terms
under which Able and Baker will interact in the future.
March 2013]
Michigan Law Review
in the first place. If, on the other hand, Able purchases Asset 2 from Baker
before specializing Asset 1, there will be no occasion for opportunistic
holdup by Baker. Able will receive all the returns from specialization, and
thus will have the appropriate incentive to invest in it. Economic integration,
through ownership of both assets by Able, will therefore be the efficient ar-
rangement if Able is the only party who makes a specialization investment.6
The downside to Able owning both assets, of course, is that Baker would
then have less incentive to make similar investments that specialize Asset 2
to Asset 1, because he would then experience a holdup problem at the hands
of Able. If Baker's specialization investment is relatively more valuable than
Able's investment, then economic integration under Baker's ownership is
likely to be more efficient.
The optimal ownership structure, then, will depend on the relative im-
portance of the potential investments Able and Baker might make and the
value of these investments inside and outside the relationship. If Able's in-
vestment in Asset 1 is valuable without Asset 2, and Baker's investment in
Asset 2 is valuable without Asset 1, then neither party is in a position to
hold up the other. When assets are less complementary in this way, it is
more likely that the efficient ownership structure is nonintegration: Able
should own Asset 1 and Baker should own Asset 2, hence constituting two
separate firms that coordinate their production activities by contracting.
Theories of this sort clearly have some power in explaining whether two
firms should integrate into one firm or remain separately owned. They have
nothing to say, however, about why an entrepreneur would incorporate her
business or why a corporation would create wholly owned subsidiary corpo-
rations. Indeed, for the purposes of the property rights theory of the firm,
there is no difference between, on the one hand, a single corporation with its
various businesses operated as divisions and, on the other hand, the same
businesses operated as separately incorporated but wholly owned subsidiar-
ies of the parent. In either case, the parent corporation controls all of the
assets, so these configurations are equivalent.
Like the property rights theory, our theory also relies on the importance
of specialization investments and the potential for holdup problems as a
driver of organizational structure. But our theory provides an explanation for
the legal structure of firms that the property rights theory does not.
B. The Law and Economics Perspective: Creditor Monitoring
The legal (or law and economics) literature has come closer to explain-
ing the legal structure of firms, offering a "creditor-monitoring" theory of
subsidiaries. 7 Firms routinely obtain credit from many of their contractual
6. Seminal work on such "transaction-specific investments" includes OLIVER E. WIL-
LIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (drawing together material
from earlier books and articles), and Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable
Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & EcON. 297 (1978).
7. This theory was offered in Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated
Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 507-09, 516-17 (1976), and was developed further in
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counterparties. Those counterparties include not just financial institutions
such as banks, but also suppliers who provide goods on credit, employees
who are paid after rather than before they work, and customers who make
payment before receiving delivery. To determine the terms on which they
will extend credit to the firm, these persons must assess both the possibility
that the business will fail and the likely value of the assets that will remain
to pay creditors if it does.
Take for example a creditor who supplies cars to a car rental business
that is wholly owned by a larger travel agency that also owns a chain of ho-
tels. That creditor will be in a better position to assess the financial
soundness of the car rental business than that of the hotel chain. A creditor
that supplies laundry services to hotel chains, conversely, will be better able
to assess the creditworthiness of the hotel chain. If both the hotel chain and
the car rental business are part of the same legal entity, then both creditors
are exposed to risks they cannot easily evaluate. If, in contrast, the car rental
business and the hotel chain are organized as separate subsidiaries of the
parent, each business-and hence the creditor of each business-will be
largely insulated from the vicissitudes of the other business. Each creditor
will therefore incur less risk and monitoring costs than if there were just a
single entity, and these savings will likely be passed on, at least in part, to
the travel agency and the laundry service in the form of lower borrowing
costs.
In short, corporate subsidiaries are a way of partitioning a firm's assets
into distinct pools for the sake of pledging those assets to distinct groups of
creditors.8 In other words, the subsidiaries are playing a role much like that
performed by security interests.
But facilitating creditor monitoring through asset partitioning, though
evidently important, does not seem adequate in itself to provide a complete
explanation of the proliferation of subsidiary companies that we observe. In
many cases, subsidiaries in a corporate group house closely related business
lines that are substantially interconnected. Public firms, moreover, typically
do not provide separate accounts for each of their subsidiaries to investors;
they provide only a single, consolidated account of their assets and liabili-
ties. The creditor to one of the subsidiaries in a corporate group of this type
might find it difficult to establish which assets will back her claim in the
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE
L.J. 387, 399-401 (2000), and Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Finn, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1344-45 (2006).
8. This partitioning takes two forms. First, limited liability protects the assets of the
parent from the subsidiary's creditors. Second, the "entity shielding" provided by the corpo-
rate form protects the assets of the subsidiary from the creditors of the parent, assuring that
those assets will be available in their entirety to satisfy the claims of the subsidiary's own
creditors. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 393-98; Hansmann et al., supra note
7, at 1337-43.
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event of a default. The ambiguity of entity boundaries, therefore, may in fact
raise creditor-monitoring costs in large corporate groups, not lower them. 9
II. A NEW THEORY: BUNDLED ASSIGNABILITY
We offer here a new theory, "bundled assignability," to explain the crea-
tion of subsidiary corporations and indeed legal entities in general.'0 This
theory complements the creditor-monitoring theory in the sense that both
theories arguably predict roughly similar patterns of subsidiary companies.
But the two theories differ in significant respects. Most importantly, while
the creditor-monitoring theory focuses primarily on the costs of evaluation,
the bundled-assignability theory focuses on the utility of legal entities in
providing liquidity to the owners of a business segment by facilitating free
transferability of that segment to a new owner. Thus, our theory, in contrast
to other theories, can help explain why corporations often choose to house a
business segment-whether acquired from another firm or developed inter-
nally-as a separate subsidiary entity when the corporation anticipates
selling that segment in the future.1' The bundled-assignability theory is most
easily understood if we first examine the relevant law that the theory seeks
to illuminate.
9. See Squire, supra note 2, at 616-17. Another strong indication that the creditor-
monitoring theory is insufficient is the common practice of cross-guarantees among corporate
subsidiaries. Subsidiaries often guarantee the debt of the parent firm or of other subsidiaries
that are above, below, or parallel to them in the chains of subsidiaries that descend from the
parent. See id. at 614-15.
10. Another theory argues that subsidiary corporations can-and perhaps must-be
used to tailor both capital structures and managerial incentives to particular business segments
within a larger firm. See Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal
Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515 (2007). And yet another theory, related to the credi-
tor-monitoring theory discussed above, is offered by Margaret Blair, who points to the
importance of the corporate form to increase the stability of enterprise by limiting the rights of
a firm's owners to withdraw their share of capital from the firm. See Margaret M. Blair, Lock-
ing in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth
Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 392-93 (2003). The latter theory, however, which focuses
principally on relations among the owners of an entity rather than the relationship between the
entity and its contractual counterparties, offers little help in understanding the role of corpo-
rate subsidiaries and other entities that have a single owner.
11. The popular video rental company Netflix, discussed infra in Section fIB, serves as
fan example. In September 2011, Netflix made a very public announcement of a plan to sepa-
rate its DVD business (renamed "Qwikster") from its streaming video business-a plan
subsequently abandoned owing to consumer protests. Analysts speculated that Netflix planned
to sell Qwikster, and placing Qwikster into a separate, wholly-owned subsidiary was a way to
facilitate this eventual sale. See Matthew Shaer, Did Netjlix Create Qwikster Just to Sell It?,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.comInnovationIHorizons/
2011/0921/Did-Netflix-create-Qwikster-just-to-sell-it.
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A. The Law of Bundled Assignability
Contract law determines when rights and obligations under a contract
may be transferred (or, as we say somewhat loosely, assigned12) to a third
party. Both permission from the counterparty, and the subject and circum-
stances of the contract, inform this determination. For example, the rights of
a promisee under a simple contract for payment of a definite sum of money
are, as a default rule of contract law, generally presumed to be assignable. 3
In contrast, the rights of an employer to receive labor services from an em-
ployee are generally presumed to be nonassignable. 14
Whatever the default rule, the assignability of a contract can generally
be altered by a specific provision in the contract itself.' 5 For example, alt-
hough leaseholds are presumed to be assignable by the tenant, 6 it is
extremely common for assignability to be curtailed by a clause in the lease
prohibiting the tenant from assigning the lease without the consent of the
landlord. 7
In contrast, if a business corporation (or other legal entity' 8) is a party to
a contract, a transfer of some or even all of the ownership shares in the cor-
12. The term "assignment" most precisely refers to a promisee's transfer to a third party
of the rights to receive the promisor's performance. "Delegation" refers to a promisor's trans-
fer to a third party of the obligation to render the performance due to the promisee. "Transfer"
of a contract by a party generally means simultaneous assignment of the party's rights and
delegation of the party's duties. We use the term "assignment," however, as it is commonly
used in contracting today, to refer to a complete transfer of a contract-that is, both assign-
ment of the assignor's rights and delegation of their duties to the same third party. See E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 3 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 11.10 (3d ed. 2004).
13. See U.C.C. § 2-210(1)(a) (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317
(1981).
14. E.g., Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Hardee, 932 F Supp. 149, 153 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(Virginia law prevents assignment of executory contracts for personal services), aff'd, 133
F.3d 916 (4th Cir. 1997). In nearly all reported cases on the assignability of an employment
contract, the assignee is seeking to enforce a covenant not to compete that was contained in
the employee's contract with the original employer. The few cases that rule in favor of assign-
ability typically involve situations in which the employee appears to be acting
opportunistically, invoking the doctrine of nonassignability just to escape the noncompete
clause. See, e.g., Evening News Ass'n v. Peterson, 477 F Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1979) (newscast-
er's contract is assignable where he accepted the assignment without objection until a
competitor tried to hire him away). Consequently, these cases presumably overstate the will-
ingness of the courts to find an employment contract assignable when an employee resists
assignment of her contract simply because she wishes not to work for the proposed assignee.
15. Even when a promisor's obligations under a contract are assignable, the promisor
remains liable to the promisee after those obligations have been transferred to a third party,
unless the promisee specifically agrees that the original promisor will be excused from such
continuing liability. We discuss residual liability further infra in Section IV.E.
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 15.1 (1977).
17. See infra Appendix B, Table 1 (99 percent of the leases in our sample contain ex-
plicit nonassignment provisions).
18. For simplicity, we'll restrict our explicit attention here to corporate-type or "strong-
form" legal entities. These are legal entity forms, such as the ordinary business corporation
(joint stock company), that are endowed with (1) limited liability for the firm's owner(s) (e.g.,
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poration is not considered an assignment of the contract. 9 The corporation,
and not its shareholders, is considered to be a party to the contracts, and the
corporation maintains its identity as its ownership changes. This rule is gen-
erally interpreted quite broadly. For example, the courts have held that the
sale of all the stock in a closely held corporation whose principal asset is a
contract does not violate a nonassignment clause even when the stock is
sold to a person to whom, previously, the counterparty had explicitly refused
that the contract be assigned. 0 If the counterparty to a contract with a corpo-
ration wishes to limit the persons to whom ownership or control of the cor-
corporation can be sold, it must do this through specific language to that
effect in the contract (a "change of control" clause); a nonassignment clause
will not suffice.
These rules make it easy for contracting parties to provide that a given
bundle of contracts will not be split up, while at the same time providing
that the bundle of contracts as a whole is fully transferable. The parties need
only create a corporation that is a party to all the contracts in the bundle, and
ensure that the contracts are not assignable by that corporation. By selling
their shares in the corporation, the owner(s) of the corporation fully transfer
to the purchasers all of their rights and obligations in the contracts that make
up the bundle.
The result is an enormous savings in simple transaction costs when a
business is sold as a going concern. This point is obvious for publicly held
business corporations. If all sales of shares in such a corporation were con-
sidered an assignment of each of the firm's contracts, with the result that
many of the firm's counterparties would be relieved of their obligation to
perform, then free tradability of shares would be impossible. But there are
also substantial transaction cost savings for closely held firms, including
firms with a single owner. If the sale of 100 percent of the stock in a corpo-
shareholders); (2) strong "entity shielding" (meaning that the personal creditors of an owner
(shareholder) of the firm have no direct claim on the firm's assets, nor can they force liquida-
tion of the firm even if the owner is in bankruptcy), and (3) transferability of shares in
ownership of the firm. These three attributes are complementary and often come as a package;
they are available not just with the business corporation but also with the limited liability
company ("LLC"), the limited partnership, and the statutory business trust. See generally
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7. For further simplicity, we'll generally focus our discus-
sion just on business corporations. Most of the analysis we offer here, however, applies to
legal entities in general, from partnerships to nonprofit corporations. The crucial element is
that a change in ownership or control of the entity does not in itself constitute a breach of a
contract made in the name of the entity.
19. Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. O.R. Concepts, Inc., 69 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)
(change of ownership of stock does not constitute a violation of the selling corporation's
contractual obligations and is not an assignment of the selling corporation's interest in an
agreement). See generally Note, Effect of Corporate Reorganization on Nonassignable Con-
tracts, 74 HARv. L. REv. 393 (1960).
20. E.g., Ser-Bye Corp. v. C. P. & G. Mkts., 179 P.2d 342, 345 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1947); Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526 (Del. Ch. 1970). But see In re
Alltech Plastics, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1806 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 1987) (transfer
in bankruptcy of all the stock of a corporation whose only asset is a patent license constitutes
an impermissible assignment of the license).
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ration from one sole owner to another were considered an assignment of the
corporation's contracts, then explicit consent to the assignment would have
to be sought one by one from a large fraction of the firm's counterparties.
This consent might be obtained at the time of the sale of the business. Alter-
natively, consent to future assignments might be included as a term in the
original contract between the firm and the counterparty. (We will say more
about consent to assignment below.21) Either way, obtaining the consents-
or failing to get them-would increase substantially the transaction costs of
making the business transferable as a going concern.
There is more involved here, however, than the basic transaction costs of
drafting and negotiating contracts (large as those costs may be). The full
scope and structure of the costs avoided by disassociating the sale of a legal
entity from assignment of that entity's contracts is much more substantial
than is commonly recognized. Our theory of bundled assignability seeks to
make those cost savings clear. We first offer a simple intuitive explanation of
that theory, and then provide a more precise exposition by way of a numeri-
cal example.
B. A Sketch of Our Theory
Our theory starts with the observation that a legal entity is, quite literal-
ly, a "nexus of contracts" in the sense that it serves as the common party to
the many contracts-with suppliers, employees, and customers-through
which the firm does business. In many cases, the most important assets that
the firm holds are its contractual rights.
Consider, for example, the movie rental company Netflix. The value of
Netflix is based largely on its assemblage of contractual relationships. The
DVDs that Netflix rents to its customers are acquired via contractual agree-
ments with the major movie studios. These contracts require Netflix to make
a small up-front payment to the studio for each DVD, and then contingency
payments based on the number of times the movie is rented. Netflix also
provides streaming video to its subscribers by licensing content owned by
movie studios using similar revenue-sharing and fixed-fee agreements. All
of the real estate that Netflix occupies is obtained through long-term leases.
Most of the firm's revenues come from its pool of subscriber contracts.22
21. See infra Section IlI.E.
22. In the Netflix example, the transition from purchasing DVDs and owning them
outright to negotiating revenue-sharing contracts was crucial to the growth of the company.
According to the company's founders, these agreements made it less risky for Netflix to ex-
pand its catalog of DVD titles to include less popular titles, which, in turn, led to growth in its
subscription base. In theory, of course, Netflix could have negotiated with studios on a case-
by-case basis and agreed on different purchase prices for different titles, with lower prices for
less popular movies. They also could have used third-party financiers to acquire the capital
necessary to make these purchases. But we suspect that the device Netflix ultimately chose
involved lower negotiation costs; it also may have been more sensible, if the studios had supe-
rior information about the rental value of each title, to give them a stake in the rental
payments. A complete theory would endogenize these bilateral contracting arrangements, but
we do not make a complete attempt to explain their existence in the theory we develop here.
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A noteworthy feature of these contractual agreements between Netflix
and its counterparties (content suppliers, landlords, employees, managers,
customers, et cetera) is that they are bilateral executory contracts-that is,
they create both rights and obligations for Netflix, making the contracts
simultaneously both assets and liabilities for the firm. The potential for two-
sided opportunism that flows from such contracts gives rise to the theory of
entities that we develop in this Article.
For simplicity, and to emphasize the theory's application to subsidiaries,
we focus on a business with a single owner, which may be an individual or a
corporation. We assume that the business's contractual rights contribute im-
portantly to its value. More particularly, we focus on environments in which
the business's contractual counterparties are largely unconcerned with the
identity of the owner of the business. Rather, they are concerned with the
business's other contractual relationships. Counterparties might depend on
the quality of the other contractual counterparties. Most obviously, a transfer
of a customer contract to a firm that uses lower-quality inputs might result in
lower-quality output for the customer. The difference in quality might be
important to the customer but difficult to describe in a contract and difficult
for a court to verify after the fact. We will call this the nonverifiable quality
problem. This problem affects contracts with suppliers as well as with cus-
tomers. For example, the owner of a high-class shopping center may care
about the quality of a shoe store to which he leases space. In particular, he
may be concerned about the personal qualities of the individual hired to
manage the store, the character of the manufacturers whose shoes the store
is licensed to sell, and the quality of the advertisements that the store places
in various media. Consequently, the landlord will not want the owner of the
shoe business to be able to assign the store lease to a different retailer who
sells cheap merchandise, creating negative externalities for the shopping
center as a whole. But, again, it may be difficult for the landlord and the
business owner to specify in the lease a set of verifiable characteristics that
describe the firms to which he would be willing to have the shoe store as-
sign its lease.
Another reason for a business's contractual counterparty to care about
the character of the business's other counterparties lies in credit risk. Con-
sider again the owner of the shopping center. He does not want to give a
long-term lease to a retailer that holds a highly valuable franchise-and thus
is virtually certain to be capable of paying rent for the full term of the con-
tract-only to have the lease assigned to another retailer with a franchise
that is extremely shaky, creating the risk of default on the lease. And, as
with quality, it may be very difficult to specify in the lease the characteris-
tics of the assignees that the landlord would consider acceptable credit risks.
We will call this the credit-risk-transfer problem.
For a formal theory that justifies revenue sharing in the video rental context, see James D.
Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Indus-
try, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 223 (2001).
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Because of the nonverifiable quality problem and the credit-risk-transfer
problem, if a contract is freely assignable there is a risk that the owner of the
business will opportunistically assign the contract, in return for a handsome
profit, to another business whose low quality or high credit risk would oth-
erwise prevent it from obtaining the contract on such favorable terms. Or the
business owner might simply threaten such an assignment, and hold up the
counterparty for payment not to do it. It follows that, if contracts are freely
assignable, counterparties will charge higher prices to cover their risks or
refuse to contract with the firm entirely. Consequently, both a business firm
and its principal contractual counterparties may very well want to prevent
their contracts from being assigned away from the firm's existing bundle of
contracts without their consent.
At the same time, the owner-we can realistically assume-would like
the ability to sell the business in case she needs liquidity (that is, funds to
use for other expenditures or investments) or in case some other owner can
control the business more efficiently. If, however, the owner is herself the sig-
natory on all of the business's contracts-that is, the business is formed as a
sole proprietorship, so that the proprietor is herself the firm, or the business is
organized as an unincorporated division of a larger corporation-then sale of
the business requires assignment, from the current owner to the purchaser, of
all of the business's contracts. And if, for the reasons just surveyed, the busi-
ness's most important contracts are nonassignable, this will require explicit
permission from the counterparties to each of these contracts. The shoe is
then on the other foot, with the counterparties in a position to hold up the
owner of the business for most or all of the potential gains from the busi-
ness's sale.23 Foreseeing that she will be forced to share the gains from her
investments with her counterparties in the event of a sale, the owner will
have reduced incentives to make specific investments that create value for
the business. She may not expend sufficient effort in the first place to as-
semble a highly complementary set of contracts that will constitute the core
of the business's value.
When combined with the law's default rules on assignability of con-
tracts, a legal entity such as a business corporation provides a convenient
means for mitigating all of these problems.24 In particular, as we have seen,
through the use of corporate entities it is easy to create bundled assignabil-
23. Practitioner publications have noted the risk of a holdup problem when contracts do
not permit bundled assignability. See, e.g., Albert J. Li, Understanding Anti-Assignment
Clauses and Their Implications on Your Acquisition (DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP,
Austin, Tex.), July 3, 2004 ("Failure to pay close attention to the operative language while the
contract is being negotiated may create the opportunity for the non-transferring party to extort
concessions in return to its consent to the contract assignment .... The target may well have
lost the ability to assure the closing of a sweet deal for the entire company as a result of one
contract.").
24. The ability to avoid antiassignment provisions in key contracts by structuring trans-
actions as stock sales is well known by legal practitioners. See, e.g., John N. Gavin et al., The
Transfer of a Health Insurance/Managed Care Business, J. HEALTH CARE FIN., Winter 2007,
at 10.
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ity: the packaging of contracts into bundles such that a given contract cannot
be assigned individually but can be assigned together with all of the other
contracts in the bundle.
To illustrate the intuition behind our results, we present a numerical
example in the next Part. The example illustrates the economic benefits of
bundled assignability in mitigating the bilateral opportunism problems
described above.
III. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF THE THEORY
Our numerical example focuses on the owner's relationship with her in-
put suppliers and the credit-risk-transfer problem that those suppliers
confront. Most of the underlying logic applies as well to the nonverifiable
quality problem. We focus on the credit-risk-transfer problem simply be-
cause it lends itself more intuitively to quantification. The key to both
problems is that the expected quality of performance to the firm's contractu-
al counterparties depends on the identity and quality of the firm's other
inputs: the owner has an incentive to opportunistically transfer a given con-
tract to a firm with lower-quality inputs, making a profit on the transfer. As a
result, counterparties ask for protection by bundling their contracts with the
firm's other inputs, ensuring that they will benefit from the creditworthiness
and quality of performance promised by that combination of complementary
inputs.
Consider the following numerical example. For concreteness, the example
focuses on a fictional business, Patriot Beer, which makes high-quality, mi-
crobrewed beer.25 Marion, the owner who started the business, developed a
formula for making a smooth, rich-flavored beer. (Marion could be a flesh-
and-blood individual or a business corporation; our analysis applies equally.)
To produce the beer, Marion established contractual relationships with five
key parties: a supplier of glass bottles, a supplier of ingredients, a manufactur-
er that produces the beer according to the company's specifications, a
distributor to transport the beer to bars and restaurants, and a landlord from
whom she leases the office space for the company headquarters. In reality,
of course, a beer maker will have many more contracts and will own out-
right some of the assets used in production. We assume that all inputs are
obtained by contract simply to illustrate clearly the novel aspects of our the-
ory; we keep the number of contracts to five so that the math stays
manageable.
The goal of our numerical example is to demonstrate the potential bene-
fits of organizing the Patriot Beer business to make the beer contracts
"bundled assignable" rather than individually assignable. In other words, the
most efficient economic configuration is one that allows Marion to assign
25. The fact pattern is based, very loosely, on Boston Beer, the maker of Sam Adams.
Prior to 2007, nearly two-thirds of the beer sold by the company was produced by third-party
brewers through contractual relationships, and the company had contractual relationships for
all its other inputs, as the example suggests. See Boston Beer Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K)
33-35 (Dec. 26, 2009).
[Vol. 111:715
Legal Entities
the Patriot Beer contracts freely to a new owner, but only as a bundle.26 For
the sake of exposition, we will assume that all of the contracts required for
making Patriot Beer are signed by Patriot, a separate corporate entity that is
wholly owned and controlled by Marion, regardless of whether the contracts
are individually assignable or bundled assignable. 7 Also, for the purposes of
this example, when we say that a contract is "assignable," we take the lin-
guistic liberty of meaning that all of the assignor's rights and obligations
under the contract can be transferred to an assignee free of any residual lia-
bility for the assignor.28
We focus particularly on Patriot's contract with the bottle supply com-
pany. In principle, however, the same incentives could affect any of Patriot's
contractual partners, as long as they provide credit along with their supplies
or services. Moreover, the owner would face the same incentive problems
with respect to the bottle supply contract if the other inputs are assets owned
outright.2 9
Suppose that there are four important dates: 1, 2, 3, and 4. At Date 1,
Marion assembles the five contracts required to produce beer. At Date 2,
Marion decides whether to invest in specializing Patriot's relationships with
its suppliers for the purpose of making those relationships more productive.
At Date 3, before any supplies are received or any production begins, Mari-
on can decide whether Patriot should make adjustments, such as assigning
her contracts with her initial suppliers or replacing them with new suppliers.
In particular, if Marion needs liquidity, she can cash out by selling (assign-
ing) some or all of the assembled contracts. Date 4 captures the final stage,
when the outcomes of the decisions made through Date 3 are realized. Sup-
pliers provide their inputs and beer is produced and distributed. The beer is
then sold and the firm receives payment for it. At this point, the firm ceases
production, pays off its obligations, and returns any leftover income to its
owner/shareholder. The firm then dissolves.
26. Again, though we use the pronoun "her," Marion could very well be a corporation.
27. We postpone to Part VI our discussion of why the creation of a separate legal entity
is a more effective way to create bundled assignability than if Marion signed these contracts in
her own name.
28. We discuss residual liability infra in Section V.E. Also, to focus squarely on issues
involving assignment of contracts and bundling, we temporarily postpone analyzing any effect
that the owner's other assets and liabilities might have on the problem. Suppose Patriot Beer
were organized as an unincorporated division of the Marion Corporation instead of as a sepa-
rate subsidiary, and suppose also that Marion owns and operates an unincorporated spirits
division. The suppliers to Patriot Beer might value the ability to attach the assets in the spirits
division if Patriot defaults on its obligations. Conversely, they might be concerned that the
creditors of the spirits business might attach the assets in Patriot Beer if the spirits business
defaults, thus reducing the likelihood that Patriot's suppliers receive full payment. Placing
Patriot Beer in a separate subsidiary entity provides more separation of the assets and liabili-
ties of the beer and the spirits businesses, and this might affect the owner's decision problem.
We take up these important asset-partitioning issues in the next Section.
29. To focus clearly on incentives, we assume that all parties are risk neutral. We also
assume, for simplicity, that the time rate of discount is zero.
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To understand assignability of contracts in this example, we must have
some form of credit risk, as well as a potential assignee. Thus, we will as-
sume that beer makers may fail and become unable to pay off their
suppliers. Concretely, suppose that if any beer maker (including Patriot)
succeeds it receives a cash flow of 100 at Date 4, but if it fails it receives a
cash flow of 0.
Beer makers differ in their probability of success. Because Marion con-
ducted a thorough search and identified high-quality supplies that are ideally
designed to make best use of Patriot's premium formula for beer, Patriot has
a high probability of success. In particular, suppose that Patriot's probability
of success, after assembling the bundle of inputs, is 0.95. This captures the
fact that the original assembly of inputs is high quality and/or complemen-
tary, and thus the best suited to producing Patriot Beer. The distributor, for
example, might be physically located near the brewing plant, minimizing
delivery costs. Or it might have the special skills needed to market and dis-
tribute premium beer.
A second beer maker, Milwaukee's Worst ("MW"), is a fly-by-night
company that uses cheap, standardized ingredients and a standard brewing
formula, and consequently makes lower-quality beer. Because its owners did
not exercise a great deal of care in assembling its supply relationships or
monitoring their quality, MW has poor future prospects. In particular, sup-
pose that its probability of success, using its current inputs, is only 0.5.
Since MW does not attempt to produce a specialized product, we suppose
that MW can change any of its inputs without affecting its probability of
success.
A. Investments in Complementarities
After assembling the inputs at Date 1, Marion has the opportunity at
Date 2 to make an additional investment that further enhances the
complementarity of the inputs-that is, an investment that makes the various
inputs more valuable as a bundle. To give a concrete example, suppose that
Patriot uses a real-time inventory system that keeps the bottling company
informed about the quantities of bottles needed for the upcoming month.
While the investment could be used with another bottler, the time spent
installing the software at the current bottler's headquarters and training the
employees at the current bottler to use and respond appropriately to the
information would be specific to that bottler, increasing the complementarity
between Patriot and the bottling company. If a replacement bottling
company were found, that effort and expense would need to be replicated
with the replacement's employees. This makes the initial bottler more
valuable than a replacement once this costly investment is made. At the
same time, if the bottling contract were transferred to MW and MW did
not-as we assume-use this inventory management system, the
investment would be of no use to Patriot.
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Suppose that Marion can choose whether to invest 2 in the training of
the bottler's employees to use the inventory software.3 ° If the investment is
made and the bottle supplier is kept in place, we suppose that Patriot's prob-
ability of success increases from 0.95 to 1. If the investment is not made,
then the probability of success will be 0.95, whether the supplier is replaced
or not. In other words, the investment is required to make the bottle supplier
fully complementary with the rest of Patriot's operations; if the investment
is not made, then all bottlers are identical.
Given our assumptions about the costs and benefits, the investment is
valuable. It costs 2, but it raises the probability of success by 0.05. Since
success pays 100, the expected gross benefit of the investment is
0.05 • 100 = 5, and its net benefit is 5 - 2 = 3.
B. Contracts and Assignability
Patriot signs long-term contracts with each of its five suppliers. These
contracts provide that the relationship will remain in place from Dates 1 to
4, so that the suppliers cannot terminate at Date 3 without breaching their
contract. This long-term commitment of suppliers is valuable to Marion be-
cause she plans to make long-term investments in Patriot that will use these
particular suppliers. The long-term contracts, then, protect the owner against
the now-familiar "holdup problem." A supplier might opportunistically
threaten to withdraw his input after Marion makes her investments in Patriot
and use this threat to extract from Marion some of the value of those in-
vestments.
The potential holdup problem by suppliers also gives Marion an incen-
tive to make the bundle of contracts freely transferable in some form--at
least as a whole-so that Patriot can be sold without the consent of the sup-
pliers. Suppose, in particular, that Marion anticipates that she might have
liquidity needs at Date 3, or that Patriot might have more value under a new
owner at Date 3, and thus that she will wish to sell Patriot at that date. Re-
quiring the consent of her suppliers to transfer the bundle to a new owner
would lead to a holdup problem, in which suppliers agreed to consent only
if they received some of the gains of her investments. Given that Marion will
want to avoid the potential for this holdup problem, we will focus on alter-
natives that allow for free transferability of the bundle of contracts at Date 3.
30. We assume, as is standard in the economic theory-of-the-finn literature, that this
investment is noncontractable. If, on the contrary, the suppliers could somehow require the
owner to make this investment and specify its terms completely in a contract, then it would not
be important whether the bottle supplier's contract were assignable. It is, however, realistic to
assume that there are often important components of the investment decision that are noncon-
tractable (how hard the owner works to implement the software, the amount of time spent
training employees, et cetera).
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C. Credit Risk
Let us assume that supply and demand in the market for supplies is such
that each supplier (of bottles, hops, et cetera) requires an expected payment
of 10 in exchange for supplying his input. To assure that the suppliers have a
strong incentive to perform well (or, alternatively, because Patriot does not
have good access to other sources of financing), the suppliers will be paid
only at Date 4. This means that, prior to Date 4, the suppliers are creditors
of Patriot.
Given that the expected payment must equal 10, the bottle supplier must
ask for a payment larger than 10 to compensate for the risk of default if
there is any chance that the beer company will fail. In particular, if the sup-
plier expects to be paid by a beer maker that has probability of success p,
then the supplier must contract for a repayment of 10/p at Date 4.31 Thus, if
each supplier expects that Patriot will be responsible for repaying him, that
Patriot will use all of its original contracted inputs, and that Marion will
make the inventory investment, then each supplier will demand exactly 10 in
repayment at Date 4, since success is certain under these conditions. If, al-
ternatively, a supplier contracts with a beer maker, like MW, whose
probability of success is known to be only 0.5, then the supplier will insist
on a promise of repayment of 10/0.5 = 20 at Date 4.
D. Investment with Bundled Assignability
Suppose, first, that Patriot promises all five of its suppliers that all of
their contracts, if assigned at Date 3, will be kept together as a bundle, and
thus cannot be individually assigned. We can now analyze Marion's incen-
tive to make the investment in the inventory management software. We
would expect Marion to make the decision that maximizes the value of her
ownership of Patriot, net of the cost of any investment.
The value of Patriot to Marion is the expected net payment that Patriot
will receive at Date 4 if the business succeeds and pays off all of its suppli-
ers. 32 Suppose that the suppliers anticipate that the investment will be made.
(This belief will be confirmed by Marion's decision, as we will see). 33 If so,
they will demand a contract price of 10, since Patriot would succeed for sure
if these beliefs hold true.
31. The supplier will be repaid in full with probability p and paid nothing with proba-
bility (1 -p), since the cash flow in failure is zero. So if the supplier demands a repayment of
10/p, then his expected repayment will be p. (101p) + (1 - p) - 0 = 10, which is his required
expected payment.
32. We assume that a buyer would be willing to pay the full expected value of Patriot's
cash flows at Date 3 if Marion decides to sell, so Marion's future payoff does not depend on
whether she has liquidity needs.
33. In any equilibrium, suppliers must have a contract price that gives them an expected
repayment of 10, given their beliefs about Marion's future behavior, and Marion's behavior
must be consistent with the suppliers' beliefs. Under nonassignable contracts, Marion chooses
to invest-hence, the contract price of 10 is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
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If Marion makes the investment, the value of her equity ownership in
Patriot, net of the investment cost, will be 1 • (100 - 5 • 10) - 2 = 48. If, on
the other hand, she chooses not to invest, Patriot to her is worth 0.95 - (100 -
5 • 10) = 47.5 < 48. Given that the payoff is larger when Marion invests, she
will make the investment and, net of the investment cost, Patriot will be
worth 48 to her.
E. Investment with Individual Assignability
Now suppose that the Patriot supply contracts can be assigned individu-
ally. Marion then faces a different decision. In addition to deciding whether
to invest, Marion must also decide whether to keep the bundle intact or as-
sign the bottle supply contract individually to MW. Suppose that, in this
situation, suppliers set their contract prices on the assumption that Marion
will not invest and will assign the bottle supplier's contract. (Again, as we
will show, these beliefs are consistent with Marion's incentives and thus will
be confirmed by her behavior.) Thus, anticipating no investment, the other
suppliers expect Patriot to succeed with a probability of 0.95. As a result,
they will demand a contract price of 10/0.95 = 10.5. 34 The bottle supplier,
expecting assignment to MW, will insist on a contract price of 10/0.5 = 20.15
Given these supply costs, now consider Marion's incentives to assign the
bottle supplier's contract. First, suppose she has invested in the software. At
first glance, it might appear that there would be no incentive to assign the
bottle supply contract after investing in it, because this would mean that a
less complementary replacement supplier must be substituted. That loss of
complementarity, in turn, would reduce the probability of success from 1 to
0.95, hurting both Marion and the remaining suppliers. Moreover, MW
doesn't increase its probability of success by using Patriot's bottle supplier.
This means that it is economically inefficient for Marion to assign the bottle
supply contract to MW: the result would be to decrease Patriot's probability
of success without improving MW's. In fact, however, Marion does indeed
have an incentive to assign contracts opportunistically notwithstanding this
social inefficiency.
34. We assume that all bottlers are identical in the absence of the investment by Mari-
on. Hence, Patriot can find a replacement bottler of the same quality, and the probability of
success remains at 0.95. We discuss the possibility that the initial bottler is specialized to Pa-
triot, even in the absence of investment, infra in Section IV.B.
35. It is also possible to show that it would not be an equilibrium for suppliers to agree
to a contract price of 10, anticipating that assignment will not occur. If suppliers set a contract
price of 10, Marion will have the incentive to assign to MW for a positive price.
That the bottle supplier sets its contract price at 20, expecting with certainty assignment
to MW, results from the simplicity of the setup. In a richer model, there may be some proba-
bility that Patriot cannot find an assignee like MW, or the bottle supplier might renegotiate
with Patriot under the threat of assignment. In either case, the initial contract price will be less
than 20. But if the contract price is less than 20, the opportunistic assignment problem will
continue to occur, because MW will be willing to pay Patriot for the improvement in its con-
tract terms.
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Marion's private incentive to assign the bottle supplier arises from the
ability to replace this supplier, who demanded a high contract price of 20
owing to the assignment threat, with a supplier who will accept a lower con-
tract price under a promise not to assign. After Marion assigns the original
bottle supply contract to MW,36 she has the incentive to promise the re-
placement bottler that his contract will remain bundled with the other input
contracts. If the contract is individually nonassignable, the replacement bot-
tler will demand 10/0.95, the same contract price as the remaining suppliers.
In our numerical example, Marion's gain from the lower contract price
outweighs the lower probability of success. If Marion invests, but chooses
not to assign, she will receive 1 • (100 - 4. (10/0.95) - 1 • (10/0.5)) - 2 = 36.
If Marion invests and chooses to assign, she will receive 0.95 . (100 -
5 • (10/0.95)) - 2 = 43. Thus, if Marion invests, she nonetheless prefers to
assign the supply contract rather than keep it. While it is costly to Marion to
replace a superior input with an inferior one, this loss is more than made up
by the benefit received from opportunistically assigning the contract.
This gain to Marion from assigning the bottling contract is not a real
economic gain. Rather, it is merely a redistribution of value from Patriot's
supplier/creditors to its owner, Marion, by shifting credit risk-here the risk
of the firm's complete failure-to the suppliers. Owing to the assignment to
MW, the expected value of the payment promised the original bottle suppli-
er falls, as of Date 3, from 20 to 0.5 . 20 = 10. The other four Patriot
suppliers also lose, albeit a smaller amount: the value of each of their con-
tracts falls from 10/0.95 = 10.5 to 0.95 • (10/0.95) = 10, due to the lost
complementarity. In total, the five original Patriot suppliers lose 12 (the bot-
tle supplier loses 10 while the other four suppliers lose 0.5 each), and
Marion gains 43 - 36 = 7. On net, the total losses (12) exceed the gains (7).
The net loss of 5 is exactly the expected loss in reducing Patriot's probabil-
ity of success from 1 to .95, which creates a net expected loss to society of
0.05 • 100 = 5.
The preceding discussion shows that, if Marion makes the investment,
she prefers to assign. But if this is true, it is clear that Marion will never pre-
fer to make the investment. After all, the value of the investment will be lost
when the bottle supply contract is assigned. Marion can save herself the in-
vestment cost, and obtain the same benefit from opportunistic assignment,
by simply choosing not to invest at the outset. If she doesn't invest and in-
stead assigns, she receives 0.95 - (100 - 5 • 10/0.95) = 45. Since 45 is the
36. In this numerical example, MW would be a willing assignee of Patriot's supply
contract, without giving or receiving compensation from Patriot. After all, a bottle supplier
contracting with MW would demand a contract price of 20, which is exactly what Patriot's
contracting party demands. Thus, MW is indifferent between being an assignee of Patriot's
supply contract and contracting on its own.
For simplicity, we are assuming in this example that all bargaining power lies with Patri-
ot when Patriot contracts with its five suppliers or contracts with MW. Hence, in the
assignment to MW being discussed here, MW is left no better off than it was before and Patri-
ot receives all of the gains from the transaction. Results are similar, however, if bargaining
power is shared between the parties.
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highest possible payoff for Marion of the four possible choices when con-
tracts are assignable, 37 she will choose not to invest and to assign. 8
F. Comparing Individual and Bundled Assignability
Let us assume that, when entering into contracts for Patriot at Date 1,
Marion understands the preceding calculations of her expected returns from
Patriot. Then Marion knows that bundling the supply contracts together
gives her an incentive to make the investment, and hence (as we saw above)
produces a payoff of 48. This is higher than 45, the highest payoff she
would receive if the contracts were individually assignable. The difference
between the two payoffs, 48 - 45 = 3, is the net social value of the invest-
ment.
The reason why Marion's private return is equal to the social gain from
the investment is that we have assumed that all of Patriot's suppliers also
understand the preceding calculations and therefore price Marion's expected
behavior into their contracts. This means, in turn, that the cost of any social
inefficiency is borne by Marion at the end of the day. Thus, given a choice
about how to arrange the bundle at the outset, Marion will choose to sign
contracts with her suppliers that are bundled assignable-that is, the con-
tracts will prohibit assignment of any one contract apart from the other
contracts in the bundle. This contracting structure gives Marion the incen-
tive to make the decision that is consistent with both social and private
efficiency.
In sum, this simple example demonstrates that bundled assignability can
offer important advantages over the two basic alternatives: complete non-
assignability on the one hand and individual assignability on the other. It
remains to be asked how bundled assignability is achieved in practice, and
particularly whether legal entities such as the business corporation are nec-
essary or sufficient for that purpose. Before addressing that issue, however,
we consider the degree to which the conclusions we have drawn from our
numerical example depend on the assumptions we have made in construct-
ing that example.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING THE ASSUMPTIONS
All theories rely on assumptions, and our theory is no exception. But the
main result we have described here-that bundled assignability can be supe-
37. Marion's payoff if she does not invest and does not assign is .95 • (100 - 4 - 10/0.95
- I • 10/0.5) = 36 <45.
38. For the moment, we are not allowing the parties to renegotiate in the shadow of a
potential assignment. We show infra in Appendix A.4 and supra in Section IV.D that free
assignability also weakens incentives to invest in the presence of renegotiation, as long as the
supplier has some bargaining power in renegotiation. If the supplier does have bargaining over
the assignment decision, then the supplier will extract some of the value of Marion's invest-
ment, the prospect of which will weaken Marion's incentive to make the investment in the first
place.
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rior to individual assignability in creating and preserving the value of the
bundle that constitutes a firm-is remarkably robust when we vary the as-
sumptions made in the numerical example above. In this Part, we consider
several changes to our assumptions, and explain why our results do not de-
pend on these changes. In Appendix A, we modify the numerical example
of Part III to reflect each of these alternative assumptions in turn, and show
that the results we derived in Part III are robust to these changes.
A. Bundling Contracts with Assets Owned Outright
Our results do not depend on the assumption that all of Patriot's inputs
are obtained by contract rather than owned outright by the firm (as one
might expect, for example, with machinery). As long as one of the inputs is
acquired via a bilateral contract, there may be value in bundling that input
with the firm's other inputs. Marion has the same incentive to opportunisti-
cally assign a bilateral contract to a less creditworthy firm even if the other
inputs are assets she owns instead of contracts. As before, the opportunistic-
assignment motive reduces Marion's incentive to make valuable investments
in complementarities between the contract-based input and the firm's other
inputs. Knowing that any inefficiency is ultimately reflected in the value of
her ownership of Patriot, Marion has an incentive to tie the contract to the
firm's other inputs, whether they are contracts or assets owned outright.39
B. Other Sources of Complementarities
The benefits of bundling also do not depend on the assumption that the
complementarities between the inputs flow from an investment made by
Marion after the inputs are assembled. The bottle supplier might be worth
more with Patriot for reasons that have nothing to do with Marion. For
example, the bottle supplier might be physically located near the Patriot
brewery, minimizing delivery costs. As long as there is some potential for
an inefficient and opportunistic individual assignment to occur at Date 3,
Marion will have the incentive to commit herself to avoiding this ineffi-
ciency by bundling complementary inputs at the outset.40
C. Other Sources of Inefficient Assignment
Our example assumes that an individual assignment is socially inefficient
because the inputs are complementary: that is, they are worth more together
than apart. But there might be other reasons why separation of inputs is
inefficient. As an example, if Patriot's contracts are individually assignable,
Marion might spend valuable time and energy searching for opportunistic,
high-risk assignees like MW instead of adding value to the business. Just as it
is in Marion's interest to commit to keeping complementary inputs together,
it is also in Marion's interest to commit to her counterparties at Date 1 that
39. See infra Appendix A. 1 for a numerical example.
40. See infra Appendix A.2 for a numerical example.
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she will not incur these wasteful expenditures. Bundling contracts together
is a way to achieve this commitment. 41
D. Renegotiation in the Shadow of Assignment
In the example above, when we assumed that contracts were individual-
ly assignable, we did not allow Marion to renegotiate with the bottle
supplier under the threat that she would assign his contract to MW; we
simply assumed that she would assign the contract if doing so offered her a
profit. Yet both parties would have an incentive to renegotiate. Investment
specializes the bottle supplier to the other inputs in Patriot, making the bot-
tle supply contract worth more when bundled with Patriot than with MW. If
Marion invests, an individual assignment to MW would be inefficient. Given
this potential inefficiency, both parties would be better off if Marion were to
agree not to assign the bottle supplier's contract in return for a payment
from the bottler that is less than what the bottler would lose from assign-
ment, but greater than what Marion would gain. An inefficient assignment
would thereby be avoided.
A first objection to this kind of renegotiation might be that it virtually
never occurs, presumably because a merchant that tries to extract payments
from suppliers by making such opportunistic threats will quickly get an in-
tolerably bad reputation. But even if we assume that such renegotiation will
occur-as economic modelers often do-individual assignability will con-
tinue to produce weaker investment incentives for Marion than will bundled
assignability. The weaker investment incentives follow because Marion's
investment in complementarities between the bottle supplier and the other
inputs creates a surplus over which the parties can bargain. As long as the
bottle supplier has some bargaining power in renegotiation, he will capture
some of this surplus when the two parties bargain to a new agreement that
keeps the bundle together. Since, as a consequence, Marion does not capture
the full value of her investment, she will have less incentive to make the
investment in the first place.42
E. Residual Liability
The default rule of contracts is that a party who assigns (or more formal-
ly, "delegates"43) her contractual obligations to a third party remains
residually liable, as a surety, to her original contractual counterparty in case
the assignee fails to perform. The assignor can be relieved of that liability
only if (1) at the time of the assignment, the counterparty explicitly agrees
(via a "novation" of the contract) that the assignor will be relieved of residu-
41. See infra Appendix A.3 for a numerical example.
42. See Appendix A.4 for a numerical example.
43. See supra note 12.
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al liability" or (2) the original contract specifically provided that, if the con-
tract were assigned, the assignor would not retain residual liability.45 In our
numerical example, we consider only the two polar extremes--on the one
hand, contracts that are completely nonassignable by the firm and, on the
other hand, contracts that are completely assignable, in the sense that the
assignor (Patriot in our example) bears no residual liability if the assignee
(MW) fails to perform all of the contractual obligations originally undertak-
en by the assignor (which in our example means payment in full of the
agreed-upon price to the bottler).
It might at first seem that, if the assigning party were to retain residual
liability for the performance of the contractual obligations it originally
assumed (as the default rule of contract law, in fact, provides), the result
would be to obviate the need for bundled assignability. Imagine, for
example, that Patriot had the right to assign each supply contract
separately, but that-contrary to the assumption we have made in the
model above-Patriot remained residually liable to any supplier whose
contract it assigned. Marion would then have less incentive to assign the
bottler's contract to MW, since the assignment would not be as successful
in avoiding any payments due to the bottler under the contract. On the
contrary, such an assignment might be costly to Marion, since she would
also internalize the costs of losing the higher productivity achieved if the
bottler works with Patriot rather than MW. It follows that, if Marion were to
need liquidity, she would have an incentive to sell the whole firm as a unit-
that is, to assign all five supply contracts to a single purchaser.
So we might think that individual assignability of contracts, combined
with residual liability for the assignor, could preserve the incentive for
Marion to assign complementary contracts only together in an efficient
bundle-which, in turn, would provide the appropriate incentive for Marion
to make efficient investments that will further specialize the suppliers' con-
tracts to each other. But residual liability has several weaknesses, both from
Marion's perspective and from the perspective of the firm's counterparties.
From the counterparty's perspective, residual liability is imperfect be-
cause it provides only a partial solution to owner opportunism. While
residual liability might mitigate the credit-risk-transfer problem that is the
subject of our numerical example, it will not solve the other problem to
which bundled assignability is addressed, namely the nonverifiable quality
problem. A customer who contracts with a particular owner in part because
the owner's business sells high-quality goods might find that his contract has
44. See Rosenberg v. Son, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 71, 74 (N.D. 1992) (original franchisee
liable to franchisor on franchise contract that had twice been resold); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 12, § 11.11.
45. The majority view in the case law is to consider as valid a party's consent in the
original contract to release the counterparty from residual liability should the counterparty
subsequently assign the contract. See, e.g., Fay Corp. v. BAT Holdings I, Inc., 646 F. Supp.
946, 952 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Fay Corp. v. Frederick & Nelson Seattle, Inc.,
896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1990); Chiarello v. Axelson, 76 P.2d 731, 733 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1938).
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been assigned to another supplier who produces lower-quality goods. To the
extent that this difference in quality is difficult to specify in a contract in a
way that a court can verify, residual liability will not provide a remedy.
Moreover, while residual liability provides some protection to a coun-
terparty against credit risk transfer, it is unlikely to provide the same
protection as a direct claim against a going concern, which is what bundled
assignability offers. If Marion sold Patriot by assigning the five contracts for
money (whether as a bundle, or individually in some form), the counterpar-
ties would-under the default rule of residual liability-have claims against
the proceeds of the assigned contracts held by Patriot. Marion would have
strong incentives to take actions that would lessen the value of these residual
claims against the pool of money, and would have many options for doing
so. For example, Marion could dissolve Patriot and have its cash paid out to
Marion as a liquidating distribution.46 Marion could also have Patriot invest
the proceeds in a high-risk venture. Such efforts at claim dilution face any
creditor of a going concern, of course, but they are more severe when the
underlying assets are easily fungible, like the cash or securities received in
an asset sale. Suppliers to a going concern are also better able to monitor the
activity of that concern than they are able to monitor a firm-in particular,
the former owner of the going concern-with which the supplier has no on-
going relationship other than that the firm remains a surety to the supplier.
Residual liability is also problematic from Marion's perspective. If
residual liability is to be effective in shielding counterparties from the
credit-risk-transfer problem, it will also necessarily restrict Marion's
liquidity when Marion wants to assign the bundle of contracts and spend the
proceeds. To provide an effective guarantee to the counterparty in a freely
assignable contract, as we have seen, Patriot would not only need to promise
that it remains residually liable on the contract, but Patriot would also need
to make a credible promise to retain enough assets to make good on the
counterparty's claim if the assignee breaches. And, even if there were an
effective mechanism for making such promises credible, the consequence of
the commitment would be to limit severely Marion's ability to use the
proceeds from the sale until the assigned contracts expire.4 7 That is, as
46. There are of course legal limits on such opportunism, but they are necessarily im-
perfect. For instance, Delaware corporation law makes shareholders who receive a liquidating
distribution personally liable for three years after that distribution for debts owed by the cor-
poration. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 278, 281-282 (2011). But after three years, that liability
disappears, creating an opportunity. See, e.g., Riley v. Murdock, 828 F. Supp. 1215, 1220
(E.D.N.C. 1993) (dismissing, as brought beyond the three-year limit, employee's action to
recover under Delaware General Corporation Law § 278 funds looted from a pension fund and
then distributed by subsequently dissolved corporation).
47. One could imagine efforts to get around this. For example, Marion might agree to
hold the cash proceeds from the assignment for the benefit of the bottle supplier, and borrow
against them to satisfy her liquidity needs. Presumably, Marion would also need to find a way
to guarantee that this personal borrowing could not be senior in priority to the residual liability
claim of the supplier, or else the bonding value of residual liability would be lost. If this were
feasible (which is not at all certain), an outside lender might be willing to lend against this
pool of cash with a junior claim to the residual claims of the suppliers. But in reality, problems
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Patriot's residual liability is made a more credible safeguard, there is a
proportionate decline in the amount of liquidity that Marion obtains from
the ability to sell her contractual rights.
Even if Marion has no immediate need for liquid funds, she has other
reasons to limit exposure to residual liability claims after a sale of Patriot.
The value of the residual liability claim will depend on the subsequent ac-
tions and efforts of the assignee and the counterparties, which would be out
of Marion's control. In economic language, Marion would be subject to a
moral hazard problem. The assignee would not internalize the cost that fail-
ure of its business would impose on Marion. The counterparties might not
monitor the assignee as intensely, knowing they could recover from Patriot.
These economic inefficiencies would ultimately be borne by Marion, so
Marion would prefer a contracting solution that avoids them.48
In short, owners will value the ability to transfer a bundle of contracts in
a way that does not give rise to residual liability. Bundled assignability can
provide Marion with the best of both worlds in a way that individual assign-
ability with residual liability cannot; Marion can assure her counterparties
by bundling their contracts together, and satisfy her liquidity needs in a way
that limits moral hazard simply by selling her interest in the entity.
F. The Parent Company Has Other Assets and Liabilities
Suppose that Marion is a parent corporation that owns, in addition to Pa-
triot, a spirits business with its own set of assets, liabilities, and contractual
relationships. In addition to deciding the contract assignability issues above,
Marion would also need to decide whether to separate Patriot's assets and
cash flows from the potential claims of Marion's spirits creditors. That is,
should the contracts and assets of the spirits business be placed in a single
bundle together with the Patriot contracts, or should they be kept separate,
perhaps in a bundle of their own?
The numerical example assumed that Marion set up a separate corpora-
tion called Patriot and that Patriot served as the common party to the
supplier contracts. Under the default rules of law, this structure would pro-
vide for asset partitioning: Patriot's suppliers/creditors would have priority
of incomplete information about the value of these residual claims would likely render this
solution ineffective as a means of providing liquidity to Marion.
48. According to lawyers who specialize in corporate mergers and acquisitions, the
selling party in an asset sale will often obtain from the purchaser an agreement to hold the
selling party harmless from any claims by counterparties to contracts that the seller has as-
signed to the purchaser. These agreements are presumably of relatively little value to the
seller/assignor, however, when the purchaser/assignee is insolvent. But this is precisely the
situation in which residual liability seems most likely to be invoked, since the counterparty
would likely find it easier to simply pursue the purchaserlassignee directly if that party were
solvent. E-mail from Paul Kingsley, Partner, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, to Henry Hansmann
and Marshall S. Huebner, Partner, Davis, Polk & Wardwell (Mar. 2, 2012, 12:32 EST) (on file
with authors); E-mail from Charles Nathan, Partner, Latham & Watkins (Feb. 15, 2012; 11:41
EST) (on file with authors); Interview with Ruben Kraiem, Partner, Covington & Burling
(Oct. 23, 2009); Interview with Ruben Kraiem, Partner, Covington & Burling (Feb. 18, 2011).
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over the spirits creditors with respect to the assets and cash flows generated
by Patriot Beer.49 But Patriot's creditors would not have any claim to assets
owned by the spirits business, since the parent corporation would have lim-
ited liability for the debts of its subsidiary.
If, by contrast, Patriot were held as an unincorporated division of
Marion-that is, if Marion served as the signatory of both the Patriot Beer
contracts and the spirits contracts-then there would be no asset partitioning.
All creditors would share in the common pool of assets created by the spirits
and beer divisions. If it were possible, might Marion consider making the
Patriot Beer contracts bundled assignable, but not partitioned from the
spirits division?
Extending the logic of our theory, it is unlikely that Marion would want
to do this. More likely, business owners like Marion will prefer that a trans-
ferable bundle also be a partitioned bundle. Partitioning ensures that the
bundle of assets and contracts bonding the suppliers/creditors' claims when
a sale does not occur is the same as the bundle that bonds suppli-
ers/creditors' claims when a sale does occur. Defining the two bundles
differently can give rise to the same opportunistic transfer problems we en-
counter in our Patriot Beer example.
To see this, consider the possibility that Patriot Beer and the Marion
spirits division are separable but not partitioned. In other words, suppose
Marion could sell Patriot by freely assigning the Patriot bundle to a new
owner. The sale would separate the Patriot bundle from the spirits bundle.
Suppose this is possible without the consent of any contractual counterpar-
ties (and without residual liability, which is problematic for the reasons
above),50 but the contractual counterparties in each bundle have claims on
the common pool of assets generated by the two businesses if they are not
separated. This legal structure would give Marion an incentive to sell Patriot
Beer even if it is inefficient to do so. The sale of Patriot would divert value
from Patriot's contractual counterparties by exposing them to greater credit
risk. The contractual counterparties to the beer business would have a small-
er pool of assets to reach in case the business were to become insolvent after
the sale. As with Patriot and its bottle supplier, the potential to divert value
from contractual counterparties creates an incentive for opportunistic trans-
fers by Marion. And this reduces Marion's incentive to invest in any
complementarities that might exist between the spirits business and Patriot
Beer.
As a result, if Marion values the option to sell Patriot at a later date, she
will likely prefer to partition the assets and liabilities of the two firms at the
outset. By ensuring that Patriot's counterparties have no claim to Marion's
other assets whether or not Patriot is eventually sold, Marion eliminates her
49. See supra note 8.
50. As before, if Marion values the ability to sell Patriot at a later date (for liquidity
reasons or because the spirits division may have negative synergies with Patriot), Marion will
likely prefer to avoid residual liability. Marion will not want to be exposed to a liability whose
value would be determined by the actions of Patriot's new owner.
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capacity to make an opportunistic transfer, and hence enhances investment
incentives.
G. The Costs of Nonassignability
We do not mean to imply that all contracts should be made non-
assignable in all circumstances. Note that we have assumed, so far, that the
inventory software investment made by Marion is valuable only when used
in the current bundle. It is also possible that, after making an investment in
an asset, Marion realizes that the asset has more value outside the current
firm than inside. In the context of our Patriot Beer example, it may turn out
that the bottle supply contract, after the investment in the inventory man-
agement software, has more value with MW (or some other brewer) than it
has with Patriot. If this is the case, removal of Marion's option to assign
freely can lead to a holdup problem: the supplier might extract value from
Marion when the investment is worth more outside the bundle than inside,
but Marion must seek the supplier's permission to assign his contract.
This suggests that there is a potential cost to making a contract
individually nonassignable. More often than not, we would expect that
Marion will choose a particular counterparty because-as with the bottle
supplier-the inputs provided under the contract with that counterparty
will be complementary with the current firm, and investments in that
relationship will increase these complementarities. Nevertheless, there may
be circumstances in which Marion and her counterparty will agree to make
their contract assignable. When Marion's incentive to assign
opportunistically is low (due to the absence of a credit-risk-transfer or
nonverifiable quality problem) or when it is sufficiently likely that an
investment in the relationship will be worth more outside the bundle than
inside, free assignability can be preferred to nonassignability.5'
V. ACHIEVING BUNDLED ASSIGNABILITY WITH
AND WITHOUT LEGAL ENTITIES
Our economic theory shows that bundled assignability resolves the ten-
sion between an owner's need for liquidity and counterparties' demand for
protection against opportunism, while giving owners efficient incentives to
assemble contracts that are complementary in value and make investments
that augment this complementarity.
51. Better still, the parties might try to make their contract conditionally assignable.
That is, they could try to write the contract to allow for free assignability when the contract is
worth more outside the firm than inside, but prevent it otherwise. If this were possible, Marion
could be prevented from opportunistically assigning the contract, and the supplier could be
prevented from holding up Marion's investments. We will revisit this issue in the context of
assignability in bankruptcy, which is a form of conditional assignability. See infra Section
VH.A.
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To understand how legal entities help establish bundled assignability,
consider two familiar arrangements for using a business corporation to
achieve bundled assignability.
First, and most simply, the owner can form a corporation of which she is
the sole shareholder, and then have the corporation sign contracts with the
firm's counterparties that are nonassignable.52 The owner will have liquidity,
because she can sell her stock in the corporation for cash and the sale of
stock will not be considered an assignment of the corporation's contracts.
This will transfer the firm's contracts, as a bundle, to its new owner. Coun-
terparties cannot prevent the stock sale, so they are unable to hold up the
owner and extract any of the value of the owner's investments in assembling
the contracts and augmenting their complementarity. At the same time, the
owner could not opportunistically transfer one of the contracts apart from
the rest without permission, because the parties are all tied to the same legal
entity.
A second way to bundle contracts by means of an entity is to write as-
signment clauses that use the entity to define the bundle. These clauses are
slightly more complicated but allow the owner to cash out by way of an as-
set sale instead of a stock sale.53 To do this, the owner sets up a corporation
and takes ownership of its stock, as before. The corporation then signs con-
tracts with its counterparties that bar individual assignment but permit
assignment to a party that acquires all (or substantially all) of the contracts
and assets of the corporation. If all of the counterparty contracts take this
form, the owner would also have bundled assignability.54
Now consider how the owner might try to achieve the same benefits
without using a separate legal entity. One way is for the owner to sign per-
sonal contracts that are nonassignable but that enumerate, in each contract,
the other components of the bundle with which the counterparty wishes to
be tied, allowing for assignment only if all the other contracts in the defined
bundle are also assigned to the same person. For a business of any measura-
ble complexity, however, this would be extremely costly and unreliable. To
take one example, Boeing uses 700 different suppliers to create one of its
airplanes.5 5 Attempting to identify and bundle each of the 700 supply con-
tracts with the 699 other contracts would be messy, labor-intensive, and
52. Keep in mind that the owner may be an individual, a Fortune 100 parent company,
or anything in between.
53. Allowing for a future asset sale, instead of a stock sale, might be useful for several
reasons. First, tax liability for the buyer and the seller will differ in an asset sale and a stock
sale. Second, the buyer might prefer to avoid any hidden liabilities that would attach to the
assets in a stock sale but not in an asset sale.
54. A sale of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets to another corporation is
generally treated as an assignment of its contracts, hence requiring consent by the counterpar-
ty of each individual contract that has not been made transferable by an explicit provision in
the contract. See Elaine D. Ziff, The Effect of Corporate Acquisitions on the Target Company's
License Rights, 57 Bus. LAW. 767 (2002).
55. Jim Destefani, A Look at Boeing's Outsourcing Strategy, MANUFACTURING ENGI-
NEERING, Mar. 2004, at 65, 67.
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potentially fraught with error and ambiguities in identification. Moreover,
because suppliers change over time, each contract would need to anticipate
these future contracts and identify them in some way before they came into
existence. In short, this is unlikely to be a practical solution in most realistic
cases.
Alternatively, bundled assignability might be achievable without an enti-
ty by way of a general description of the bundle. The owner might sign
contracts in her own name that, by their terms, permit assignment if and
only if the assignment is to a person who purchases, for example, "all or
substantially all of the assets of the Patriot Beer business." This would not
require a precise description in each contract of the other contracts that con-
stitute the bundle. This solution might prove complicated, however, in the
event that the owner wishes to separate Patriot from another business she
owns or from her personal assets, and distinguishing the Patriot Beer assets
is not easily verifiable (for example, because of shared facilities or over-
head). The Patriot suppliers might argue, for example, that the definition of
the bundle being sold is underinclusive. More particularly, they might use
this ambiguity opportunistically to hold up the owner and extract more value
from the sale. As we have seen, these opportunism problems can lead to
underinvestment in the business.
This risk will be greater to the extent that the owner runs multiple busi-
nesses that use assets and contractual rights in common. Consider, again,
Marion's spirits business. If the same distributor contract is used to distribute
both Patriot Beer and Marion's spirits, would the distribution contract be
treated as a Patriot Beer asset and be included in the sale? When key em-
ployees provide services to both firms, which employees will move with
Patriot in the event of a sale? In comparison, a bundle that references the
entity creates substantially less ambiguity. The owner need only show that
an asset not being transferred is not owned by the entity being sold, or that a
contract not being assigned has a different legal person as a signatory. This
provides more certainty and assurance against an opportunistic holdup prob-
lem.
As another alternative, parties might try to eliminate the ambiguity
problem by creating a central "node" that is common to all of the contracts
that are to be included in the bundle. For example, Marion might create a
Patriot Beer trademark, and specify in each contract that the contract can be
assigned only to a purchaser of the trademark and only on the condition that
all other contracts similarly tied to the trademark are also assigned to that
purchaser. While this approach to bundled assignability seems feasible in
principle, it also seems much clumsier than simply using a transferable
entity in combination with the default rules of contract assignability. In
addition to creating a central "node," transferable entities are necessary to
create asset partitioning.56 That is, entities make it possible to identify a
constantly changing bundle of assets and contracts to which the firm's
suppliers and other creditors-who are themselves constantly changing-
56. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 406-22.
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can attach in the event of a default.57 The entity separates these assets and
contracts from the claims of the owners' personal creditors and the creditors
of her other businesses. For the reasons listed above, asset partitioning is a
natural complement to bundled assignability-the two should generally go
together. And because asset partitioning is practically impossible without the
use of a legal entity, it follows that a legal entity is a superior method of
achieving bundled assignability.
VI. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF BUNDLED ASSIGNABILITY
Our theory explains why parties might prefer to structure their contracts
to prevent individual assignability yet permit bundled assignability. We have
also argued that legal entities play an important role in creating and identify-
ing the bundle of assets and contracts that can be freely transferred. In this
Part, we present preliminary evidence of this role from the assignment
clauses of commercial contracts. We focus on two basic questions: First, do
contracting parties actually contract for bundled assignability in practice?
Second, do they use entities as a means of achieving bundled assignability?
Our data answer both questions strongly in the affirmative. To our
knowledge, this is the first empirical study of assignability in commercial
contracts, or indeed in any type of contracts, to appear in the literature of
either law or economics."
We examine 287 supply and lease contracts from public firms, gathered
from the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") Edgar database, be-
tween 2007 and 2009. We restrict consideration to supply contracts and
leases. These contract types are likely to fit the underlying assumptions of
our theory, since they are typically bilateral executory contracts with inputs
that have the potential to become specific and complementary to the firm.
For consistency and to focus on the credit-risk-transfer problem, we also
restrict attention to the "debtor" side of the contract (the tenant or buyer).
The results are available in Appendix B.
Table 1 presents the results on individual antiassignment clauses. The
data show that contracting parties routinely contract out of individual as-
signability: the "debtor" side of the contract is explicitly prevented from
individually assigning its contractual rights and obligations in 95.5% of the
contracts in our sample. The percentage of leases that are nonassignable by
57. Id. at 417-22 (observing that a legal entity goes beyond ordinary security interests
by providing, in essence, for creation of a lien that not only floats over a constantly changing
pool of assets-namely all assets owned by the firm-but also floats under a constantly
changing pool of creditors-namely all persons to whom the firm has contractual or extra-
contractual obligations).
58. Systematic study of contract terms through the examination of large pools of com-
parable contracts is a recent phenomenon, importantly aided by the SEC Edgar database that
we use here. The Edgar database includes copies of all materially important contracts entered
into by companies registered under the federal securities laws. The pioneering work in this
area was done by Eisenberg and Miller. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Con-
tracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 335 (2007).
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the tenant is even higher than the percentage of supply contracts that are
nonassignable by the buyer (99.2% vs. 91.7% respectively). This may be
true because leases, having a larger pool of potential users, are more subject
to an opportunistic transfer problem than is a supply contract.
Table 2 reports summary statistics on bundled assignability. We define a
contract as "bundled assignable" if the contract explicitly restricts individual
assignability yet permits free assignment (under some conditions) if the con-
tract is assigned along with some other asset(s) or contract(s) in the firm. We
create two definitions of bundled assignability. In the first, the contract is
coded as explicitly bundled assignable if the contract is individually non-
assignable and explicitly permits assignment with a designated bundle.59 In
the second, the contract is coded as implicitly bundled assignable if the con-
tract is individually nonassignable but does not explicitly restrict
assignability in the event of a merger, acquisition, or change in control. As
we have discussed, this generally creates bundled assignability under the
default rules of law, since mergers and acquisitions are not held to be viola-
tions of individual antiassignment clauses. We find that bundled
assignability is very common in our sample: 85.7 percent of the contracts in
the sample create some form of bundled assignability for the debtor party to
the contract. Over 63 percent of contracts create this bundled assignability
explicitly by identifying bundles with which the contract can be assigned. An
example of an explicit bundled assignability clause from our sample is
available in Appendix C.
In Table 3, we report summary statistics for those contracts that explicit-
ly permit bundled assignability, to see whether contracting parties use
entities or some other means to define the bundles with which the contract
may be assigned. If the contract permits assignment in the event of a merger,
59. Interestingly, it appears that residual liability often is not waived when one corpora-
tion acquires another in its entirety through an asset sale. Our empirical study reveals no
instances of contract terms relieving a party from residual liability when a contract is assigned,
even when the contract explicitly permits bundled assignment via an asset sale. And conversa-
tions with practitioners indicate that relief from residual liability, though commonly sought by
the seller, is frequently not obtained via novation at the time a firm's assets are sold: counter-
parties have little incentive to consent, and the more strongly the seller insists on obtaining
novations, the more suspicious the counterparties become of the transaction and the less in-
clined they are to agree.
In any event, it seems clear that contractual counterparties in general do not consider re-
sidual liability to be adequate protection against opportunistic assignment. Perhaps the
strongest evidence of this is that nearly all of the contracts in our empirical study explicitly bar
individual assignability (which provides residual liability under the default rules of law). Re-
sidual liability may serve as an adjunct to bundled assignability in protecting counterparties in
the relatively rare event of an asset sale. But there is reason to believe that, even here, the
added protection is modest. As discussed above, there are a variety of strategies by which the
selling corporation can make it expensive or impossible to collect on a claim of residual liabil-
ity. Most tellingly, the seller usually has the choice of an asset sale or a stock sale (which
provides no residual liability) in the bundled assignability clauses we observe in our data. It is
unlikely that counterparties actively rely on residual liability as protection in the broad run of
cases, given that the seller typically has the option to deny it via stock sale (and usually exer-
cises that option).
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acquisition, or sale of "all or substantially all assets" of the contracting enti-
ty, then an entity is being used to define the bundle. Alternatively, if the
contract allows for assignment along with a specifically identified asset or
contract, or if the contract provides a general description of a bundle ("the
business/segment to which this agreement relates"), we consider the bundle
definition to be non-entity-based. Some contracts use multiple definitions of
the bundle with which the contract can travel; we record all definitions used
by the parties in a given contract.
Of the contracts that create bundled assignability explicitly, 93.9% include
an entity-based definition of a bundle, and 63.5% use only an entity-based
definition. Nevertheless, we do find evidence that bundles are sometimes
defined in a way that would not require entities: 36.5% of the bundled
assignable contracts in our sample include at least one definition of a
bundle that does not use an entity, and 6.1% of these contracts use only
non-entity-based definitions of bundles.
60
These simple summary statistics provide evidence that contracting par-
ties are aware of the economic forces underlying our theory. In practice,
parties contract explicitly for bundled assignability with great regularity.
When parties create bundled assignability, they usually, though not exclu-
sively, use entities to define the bundle with which the contract can travel.
This suggests that legal entities are a valuable, though not indispensable,
device for balancing the owner's need for liquidity against counterparties'
demand for protection against opportunism.
VII. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
Our theory also provides perspective on more specific legal issues in-
volving the relationship between contract assignability and legal entities. We
focus here on the two principal exceptions to general legal doctrine concern-
ing individual and bundled assignability. The first involves a class of
transactions, namely bankruptcy, while the second involves a class of con-
tracts, namely licenses for intellectual property.
A. Bankruptcy Law and Individual Assignability
In our numerical example, the reason why counterparties wish to restrict
the firm's ability to assign their contracts essentially lies in credit risk. And
it is the collection of other contracts to which the firm is a party that keeps
its credit risk low. This is only one of various reasons why a firm's counter-
parties may be concerned about the other contracts in the bundle held by the
firm. It is perhaps the most important reason, however, and it seems to help
60. This is not to say that entities would not be useful ex post, even if the bundle is
defined without explicitly referencing an entity in the contract ex ante. It would be much hard-
er for a supplier to argue that the firm did not transfer "the business to which this agreement
relates" if the firm sold the entire capital stock of the entity in which the business's assets and
contracts were contained. Thus, our statistics are a conservative measure of the extent to which
entities are valuable in creating bundled assignability.
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explain the law's presumptions as to whether various corporate transactions
constitute assignments of the firm's contracts.
For example, most contracts that are otherwise individually non-
assignable by virtue of their explicit terms are held to be individually
assignable in bankruptcy.61 The standard argument for this override of
contractual terms is that it helps the bankrupt debtor. By assigning an
otherwise nonassignable contract, the debtor can capture the value of a
profitable contract it does not intend to use, and this can enhance the firm's
reorganization prospects. 62 This argument proves too much, however, since
there are an infinite number of ways in which bankruptcy law could weaken
a counterparty's substantive rights to favor the debtor. Why does bankruptcy
law select this alteration of rights in particular?
Our theory provides a reason why the law leans in favor of individual
assignability for debtors in bankruptcy.63 In our numerical example, the val-
ue destroyed by opportunistic assignment arises when investments create
complementarity between contracts-that is, when the firm's contracts are
worth more together than separated. This value-destroying assignment
threat is particularly severe when the assigning firm is more creditworthy
than the potential assignee, because the payoff that might be received from
the assignee is greater when the difference in creditworthiness between the
assignor and the assignee is greater. At the same time, free assignability of
contracts might sometimes be valuable and create the best possible incen-
tives for investment. This is most likely to be true when investments have
more value outside the bundle than inside.
Bankruptcy is a particular state of the world in which individual assign-
ment of contracts is often more efficient than opportunistic. Firms in
bankruptcy are more likely than firms in the general population to be worth
more broken up than kept intact (i.e., the firm in bankruptcy is less likely to
have positive "going-concem value"). Furthermore, it is safe to assume that
firms in bankruptcy, which are typically insolvent, will be less creditworthy
than any potential assignee. The chance that a supplier to a firm in bankrupt-
cy will suffer an increase in credit risk from being assigned to another firm
is much less than would be the case if the potential assignor were financially
healthy.
In this sense, bankruptcy might be considered a way of achieving condi-
tional assignability: in states of the world that are more likely to involve
assignment of the value-destroying, opportunistic kind, the antiassignment
provisions normally included in contracts are respected. In bankruptcy
states, where opportunism is reduced and assignment is more likely to be
efficient, the law overrides contractual terms to prevent the firm's counter-
61. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (2006).
62. See, e.g., CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 865 (2d ed. 2009).
63. The Bankruptcy Code also leans in favor of assignability by relieving the estate
from residual liability after a permitted assignment. I I U.S.C. § 365(k).
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parties from holding up an efficient assignment. 64 Moreover, the opportun-
ism problem is limited by the bankruptcy judge, who is charged with
permitting assignments only if there is "adequate assurance of future per-
formance. 6
5
B. Licenses for Intellectual Property
Licenses for intellectual property constitute the most important class of
contracts that are treated as exceptions to general legal doctrines concerning
both individual and bundled assignability. We focus here on the two most
important of these exceptions: the exception to individual assignability in
bankruptcy and the exception to bundled assignability in mergers.
Intellectual property licenses are clearly subject to the credit-risk-transfer
problem that is the principal focus of our analysis. Indeed, intellectual
property licenses may be the most valuable contractual rights that the licensee
holds-they can give great value to, and gain great value from, other contracts
in the bundle if the bundle is well chosen. Because, as we have argued
immediately above, the credit-risk-transfer problem is mitigated in
bankruptcy, one might expect intellectual property licenses, like other
contracts, to be individually assignable in bankruptcy even if they contain an
explicit anti-assignment provision. But that is not the case. Contracts that
are nonassignable under the default rules of law outside of bankruptcy, such
as nonexclusive 66 intellectual property licenses, also cannot be individually
assigned by the firm when it is in bankruptcy.67
Intellectual property licenses are also important exceptions to the normal
rules that favor bundled assignability in corporate mergers and acquisitions.
The general rule is that the merger of two corporations is not considered an
assignment of the contracts of either corporation. Rather, the successor cor-
poration resulting from a merger simply assumes the rights and obligations
of all contracts previously held by each of the two merging companies just
64. We are not attempting here to rationalize the entirety of bankruptcy's treatment of
executory contracts. More specifically, our theory does not explain why the Bankruptcy Code
makes this contingent assignability in bankruptcy states a mandatory rule, as opposed to a
default rule that parties could contract around by explicitly restricting assignment inside bank-
ruptcy. While opportunistic assignment due to a credit-risk-transfer problem is substantially
less likely in bankruptcy, opportunistic assignment due to a nonverifiable quality problem may
not be. Thus, there may be good reasons to give contracting parties space to preserve non-
assignability inside bankruptcy as well as outside.
65. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(B).
66. The class of contracts that is given exceptional treatment is generally comprised of
nonexclusive licenses for intellectual property-that is, licenses to exploit a patent, copyright,
or trademark that continue to permit the licensor, or other licensees, to exploit the right as
well. A typical example might be a license in which a patent holder grants to a manufacturer
the right to use a patented production process in making the manufacturer's products, while
reserving and exercising the power to license other manufacturers to use the same process. An
exclusive license, in contrast, gives a single licensee the sole right to exploit the intellectual
property right in question.
67. See Neil S. Hirshman et al., Is Silence Really Golden? Assumption and Assignment
ofIntellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 197, 212-15 (2007).
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as if there were full continuity of corporate personality.68 If we focus on the
credit-risk-transfer problem, this rule makes good sense. In a merger, a
contract is not separated from the other contracts with which it was initial-
ly bundled. Rather, that initial bundle simply becomes part of a larger
bundle. The result is that a merger typically decreases rather than increases
the credit risk faced by the counterparties to contracts with the merging
corporations.
But here, some courts have created an exception to the general rule of
bundled assignability, holding that, in the case of a nonexclusive license for
intellectual property, a merger is to be considered an assignment.69 The re-
sult is that, absent specific consent, a license that is not individually
assignable will not pass to a corporation that results from a merger. The
courts are not unanimous on the issue, however, and the doctrine remains ill
defined and controversial. Indeed, intellectual property licenses are the al-
most exclusive focus of recent literature dealing with the effect of corporate
mergers and acquisitions on contract assignability.7"
A plausible justification for the more restrictive approach to nonexclu-
sive intellectual property licenses in both bankruptcy and mergers is that, by
their nature, such licenses can provide special occasion and incentive for
68. See Note, supra note 19, at 394.
69. The most prominent of these cases has been PPG Industries, Inc. v. Guardian In-
dustries Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1096-97 (6th Cir. 1979) (finding that a merger is an improper
"transfer" of a patent license, even in the absence of an express nonassignment clause). This
approach was pressed a bit further in SQL Solutions, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., No. C-91-1079
MHP, 1991 WL 626458, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1991) (finding an improper assignment as a
consequence of a reverse triangular merger, a form of merger that is similar to a simple sale of
stock). See also In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1806 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Dec.
30, 1987) (finding that a sale of stock constitutes an assignment, though in a bankruptcy con-
text). Some decisions-PPG, E2d at 1095, is an example-have additionally held that a
nonassignability term will be implied by law in contracts where there is no such express term,
putting the burden on the parties to a license to make the license explicitly transferable if that
is what they wish. For an extensive and thoughtful review of the case law, see Ziff, supra note
54, at 771-75.
70. See, e.g., Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Control Without Interest: State Law of Assign-
ment, Federal Preemption, and the Intellectual Property License, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2001);
Hirshman, supra note 67; Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and
Dot-Com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts In-
cluding Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c), 365(e)
and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307 (2000); Ziff, supra note
54; Jessica L. Braeger, Note, Antiassignment Clauses, Mergers, and the Myth About Federal
Preemption of Application of State Contract Law to Patent License Agreements, 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 639 (2002); Joshua G. Graubart, Unintended Consequences: State Merger Statutes and
Nonassignable Licenses, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 25; Philip M. Haines, Comment, The
Efficient Merger: When and Why Courts Interpret Business Transactions to Trigger Anti-
Assignment and Anti-Transfer Provisions, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 683 (2009); Shannon D. Kung,
Comment, The Reverse Triangular Merger Loophole and Enforcing Anti-Assignment Clauses,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1037 (2009); Peter Macaulay, Note, The Effect of Mergers on Anti-
Assignment Provisions in Contracts: A Case Note on TXO Production Co. v. M.D. Mark, 53
BAYLOR L. REV. 489 (2001); H. Justin Pace, Note, Anti-Assignment Provisions, Copyright
Licenses, and Intra-Group Mergers: The Effect of Cincom v. Novelis, 9 Nw. J. TECH. & IN-
TELL. PRoP. 263 (2010).
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two types of opportunistic assignments other than the credit-risk-transfer
problem on which we've focused. The first and most obvious is the assign-
ment of the license to another enterprise that is a direct competitor of the
licensor or of other licensees. The second is the assignment of the license to
another firm that is much larger than the original licensee, leading to a far
more extensive exploitation of the license than the licensor contemplated in
the original contract.
In contrast to the credit-risk-transfer problem, neither of these additional
forms of opportunistic individual assignment is less threatening when a firm
is in bankruptcy than when it is not. On the contrary, such opportunism vis-
a-vis the licensor may be the most rewarding course for the bankrupt firm
and its other creditors. And, in contrast to its tendency to mitigate the credit-
risk-transfer problem, a merger can in fact be a convenient instrument by
which to accomplish the opportunistic transfer of a license to a competitor
or to a much larger licensee. These special reasons for barring assignment of
nonexclusive intellectual property licenses have, in fact, been invoked by
both the case law7 and the legal literature to justify the unusual treatment
given to intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy law and merger law.
In fact, the problems of assignability presented by nonexclusive intellec-
tual property licenses in mergers can well be seen as a special manifestation
of the nonverifiable quality problem2-one in which bundling is less like-
ly to provide protection against opportunistic transfers. The essence of the
nonverifiable quality problem we described above is that a contract will be
opportunistically assigned to a person who, though posing no increase in
credit risk, would impose costs on the original counterparty in other ways.
The assignment might associate the original counterparty with a low-quality
enterprise and damage its reputation in general, or it might make it more
costly for the counterparty to perform its part of the bargain. If the relevant
differences in quality are driven primarily by the character of the firm's oth-
er contractual inputs, a counterparty can sufficiently protect herself by
insisting that her contract continue to be exploited together with the other
contracts in the original bundle.
But in the intellectual property case, simply remaining bundled with the
firm's other inputs may provide little protection against opportunistic use of
a license. The opportunism derives, instead, from the character of the ac-
quirer's existing business to which the license has been added. To put the
issue differently, a licensor may primarily wish to avoid being added to a
different bundle, whether or not the bundle to which the license is currently
tied moves together with the license.
None of this is to say that our theory demonstrates that the special rules
regarding assignment of intellectual property make good law. We have
71. See, e.g., PPG, 597 F.2d at 1096-97 (finding an invalid assignment where successor
firm was a competitor of licensor); Nat'l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 507 F.
Supp. 1113, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding an invalid as-
signment because successor firm considerably larger than the original licensee).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
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shown only why licensors of intellectual property might often have reason
to be more conservative about permitting assignment than other contractual
counterparties. It does not necessarily follow that the default rules of law
regarding assignment should be different for intellectual property licenses
than for other types of contracts, either in the context of bankruptcy or in the
context of mergers. The alternative in the case of bankruptcy is to depend on
the discretion of the bankruptcy courts to bar assignment of a license only
when the nature of the proposed assignee's business would make the as-
signment especially burdensome to the licensor. And the alternative in the
case of mergers is to leave it to licensors to insist on a change-of-control
clause-perhaps a tailored one that prohibits mergers with large licensees or
competitors of the licensor-in any license that they fear might be trans-
ferred opportunistically via merger. The choice of a default rule in these
cases, as elsewhere, involves trade-offs. Our object here is limited to clarify-
ing some of the costs and benefits that need to be weighed in the balance.73
CONCLUSION
The modem firm's value is increasingly embedded in its contractual
rights. At the same time, modem firms are increasingly organized as clusters
of subsidiary entities under the common ownership and control of a corpo-
rate parent. This Article creates a new link between the importance of
contracts and the widespread use of subsidiaries that has not previously been
emphasized.
We have argued that subsidiary entities are useful tools in facilitating the
transferability of a business segment whose value depends importantly on its
contracts. Our theory emphasizes that bilateral contracts create risks of op-
portunism by the firm and its counterparties when transferability is at issue.
Owners value the ability to sell their business segments, but counterparties
have incentives to hold up a sale and extract value from the owner when
their consent is required. Owners, by contrast, have incentives to seek out
low-quality assignees if counterparties gave an overly broad permission to
assign their contracts individually.
We show that the two-sided risk of opportunism can be mitigated
through "bundled assignability"-the owner of a business segment is free to
transfer the segment's contracts and assets to a new owner, but only if they
are transferred together. When the quality of a firm's performance depends
on its other inputs, bundling provides appropriate assurance to a counterpar-
ty that she will receive the effective performance she was promised, whether
or not the segment is sold. And it assures owners that they can get the liquid-
73. It is certainly plausible that the objections to transferring intellectual property li-
censes have become excessively salient relative to the virtues of (bundled) assignability. As
one thoughtful commentator says, in reviewing the case law, "[T]he negative effect on the
licensee caused by the non-transferability of its rights has, surprisingly, not appeared to be as
significant as the licensor's interest in controlling the identity of its licensees or is overcome
by other factors." Ziff, supra note 54, at 768. The analysis of the benefits of bundled assigna-
bility that we offer here, we hope, may help correct this imbalance.
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ity they need without risk of holdup. Mitigating these opportunism problems
is important, we show, because it encourages owners to make investments
that add value to the bundle.
Placing a business in a subsidiary entity provides a convenient and relia-
ble way to create bundled assignability. While other methods of creating
bundled assignability are also possible, these alternatives have important
flaws that weigh in favor of using a separate entity, particularly when trans-
ferability is important to the owner. Our analysis of assignment terms in
commercial contracts confirms that contracting parties recognize the bene-
fits of using entities for this purpose. An appreciation of this role of legal
entities not only refines our legal and economic theories of the firm but also
provides guidance in understanding both legal doctrine and contracting
practices regarding assignability.
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APPENDIX A: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
1. Bundling Contracts to Assets
Suppose that all numerical values are the same as in the numerical ex-
ample in the main text, except that Marion begins the game at Date 1 with
ownership of the other four inputs, free and clear of any liabilities. She must
contract for the bottles, using the bottle supplier as a creditor, as above.
First, suppose the bottle supply contract is individually assignable, and
suppose the bottle supplier will continue to demand 10/0.5 = 20, as before.
If the owner invests, but chooses not to assign, the value of her equity in the
firm is 1 • (100 - 1 • 20) - 2 = 78. If she invests and chooses to assign, the
owner will receive 0.95 - (100 - 1 . (10/0.95)) - 2 = 83. Since assignment is
preferred to nonassignment conditional on investing, the contract prices set
by suppliers are consistent with equilibrium behavior by the owner. It can
also be shown that a contract price of 10 will not constitute an equilibrium,
since the owner will prefer assignment. Since the owner prefers assignment
after investing, it is clear that the owner will never invest, for the same rea-
sons as above. The owner then will not invest but rather will assign. Her
equity value will be .95 • (100 - 1 • (10/0.95)) = 85.
Next, suppose the bottle supply contract is bundled with the other four
inputs. Suppose the bottle supplier will be willing to agree to a contract
price of 10. The owner's payoff if she does not invest is 0.95 . (100 -
1 • (10)) = 85.5. If the owner invests, her payoff, net of the investment cost,
is 1 - (100 - 1 • 10) - 2 = 88. The owner prefers to invest under bundling.
Thus, the contract prices set by the suppliers are consistent with equilibrium
behavior by the owner. Since the owner's equity is worth 88 under bundling
and 85 under individual assignability, the owner will prefer bundling at Date
1.
2. Other Sources of Complementarity
Suppose that all numerical values are the same as before, but investment
is not required to generate complementarities: if the original five inputs are
kept together, Patriot will succeed with certainty, otherwise it will succeed
with probability 0.95. It is clear that the Date 3 decision problem for the
owner is the same as the decision problem above after the owner has invest-
ed. Suppose the suppliers will set their contract prices as above: the bottle
supplier will require a contract price of 20 and the other suppliers will de-
mand 10/0.95. If the owner chooses not to assign, she will receive 1 • (100 -
4 . (10/0.95) - 1 • 20) = 38. If the owner chooses to assign, the owner will
receive 0.95 • (100 - 5 • (10/0.95)) = 45. The owner prefers to assign, since
45 > 38. Thus, under individual assignability, the contract prices set by sup-
pliers are consistent with equilibrium play by the owner. It can also be
shown that it is not an equilibrium for suppliers to set contract prices of 10,
since the owner will prefer to assign the bottle supplier at Date 3 (MW will
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pay the owner a price of 5). Given that she prefers to assign at Date 3, the
value of the owner's equity is 45 at Date 1.
Now suppose the owner bundles the five contracts together. Suppose, as
above, the suppliers agree to contract prices of 10. Given this, her equity
value is 1 - (100 - 5 • 10) = 50. Since contracts cannot be assigned, contract
prices of 10 are consistent with equilibrium. Since her equity value under
bundling is 50 > 45, the owner prefers bundling to individual assignability.
3. Other Sources of Inefficient Assignment
Another reason the owner might prefer nonassignability, in addition to
reasons that involve complementarity between inputs, is to commit herself
not to waste resources finding a potential assignee. Suppose, in contrast to
the examples above, that the current bottle supplier is no more valuable than
a replacement bottle supplier. Suppose that Patriot will succeed with proba-
bility 0.95, and MW will succeed with probability 0.5, irrespective of the
identity of the bottling company or any investment made by the owner. This
means that there are no complementarities between the bottling company
and Patriot's other inputs. Suppose, however, that the owner, at Date 2, has
the ability to search for an assignee like MW. The search costs 3 to Marion
in direct costs and forgone opportunities. If the owner does not search, then
she has no potential assignees.
Suppose first that contracts are assignable, and suppose that contract
prices under assignable contracts are the same as above. If the owner
searches and then assigns at Date 3, her payoff, net of the search cost, will
be 0.95 . (100 - 5 . (10/0.95)) - 3 = 42. If the owner does not search, and
thus does not assign, her payoff is 0.95 • (100 - 4 • (10/0.95) - 1 - 20) = 38.
Clearly the owner prefers to search and to assign, and her equity value net of
search costs is 42. If, by contrast, the owner bundles the contracts, her pay-
off is 0.95 • (100 - 5 • (10/.95)) = 45. Note that the owner's net payoff to
bundling is 45 - 42 = 3, which is equal to the cost of the search. In other
words, the search cost is socially inefficient, and these social losses are ul-
timately borne entirely by the owner. By bundling the contracts together, she
commits to preventing this loss of value.
4. Renegotiation in the Shadow of Assignment
In this example, we allow the bottle supplier and the owner to renegoti-
ate to an outcome that prevents assignment when assignment destroys value.
The simplest case to illustrate is one in which the supplier has all the bar-
gaining power in renegotiation with the owner, so we will show the main
result for this special case. In general, the qualitative result that individual
assignability weakens incentives to invest in complementarities is true as
long as the supplier has at least some bargaining power in renegotiation.
First, suppose that contracts are assignable, and suppose that contract
prices under assignable contracts are the same as above. If the owner in-
vests, but chooses not to assign, she will receive 1 • (100 - 4. (10/0.95) -
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1 • (10/0.5)) - 2 = 38. If the owner invests and chooses to assign, the bottle
supplier will renegotiate to prevent the assignment. But recall that we as-
sume the supplier to have all the bargaining power. Thus, the owner's
outcome in bargaining is the same as if she in fact assigned. Thus, the owner
will receive 0.95 • (100 - 5 • (10/0.95)) - 2 = 43, her assignment payoff. As
a result, if the owner invests, she prefers to assign the supply contract rather
than keep it.
Now suppose the owner chooses not to make the investment. Her payoff
if she does not invest and does not assign is 0.95. (100 - 4- 10/0.95 -
1. (10/0.5)) = 36. If she does not invest but does assign, she receives
0.95 • (100 - 5 • 10/0.95) = 45. Note that if the owner does not invest, there
is no positive surplus to be had from renegotiation, since the bottle supplier
is not complementary with Patriot. Thus, we can assume that the assignment
actually takes place. Since 45 is the highest possible payoff for the owner of
the four possible choices when contracts are assignable, she will choose not
to invest but instead to assign. Given these preferences, the contract prices
chosen by the suppliers are consistent with equilibrium behavior by the
owner.
Under bundling, as before, the owner's payoff is 1 • (100 - 5 • 10) - 2 =
48. Since 48 > 45, she prefers bundling to individual assignability.
APPENDIX B: TABLES
The following Tables are based upon the authors' sample of 287 lease
and supply agreements from the SEC Edgar database filed as "Material
Contracts" (Exhibit 10) between 2007 and 2009. The debtor party is the
buyer in a supply contract and the tenant in a lease contract.
TABLE 1
EXPLICIT INDIVIDUAL NONASSIGNABILITY, DEBTOR PARTY
Individually
Nonassignable Individually Nonassignable
Contract Type Contracts (N) Contracts (N) Contracts (%)
Supply 145 133 91.7%
Lease 142 141 99.3%
Total 287 274 95.5%
Table 1 reports the contracts that explicitly impose restrictions on as-
signment of the contract on an individual basis.
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TABLE 2
BUNDLED ASSIGNABILITY, DEBTOR PARTY
Explicit Bundled-
Assignable Explicit or Implicit Bundled-
Contract Type Contracts (N) Contracts (%) Assignable Contracts (%)
Supply 145 63.4% 89.0%
Lease 142 62.7% 82.4%
Total 287 63.1% 85.7%
Table 2 reports the percentage of contracts that allow for bundled as-
signability by the debtor party to the contract. A contract is coded as
explicitly bundled assignable if the contract both (a) is explicitly individu-
ally nonassignable (using the same criteria as in Table 1) and (b) explicitly
permits assignment of the contract (possibly under specified conditions) if
assigned to a party acquiring all or some specified subset of the assets or
contracts of the debtor party. A contract is coded as implicitly bundled
assignable if both (a) is individually nonassignable and (b) does not ex-
plicitly restrict assignment of the contract in the event of a merger,
acquisition, or change in control of the debtor party. The sample is described
in Table 1.
ENTITY AND NONENTITY
TABLE 3
BUNDLE DEFINITIONS, DEBTOR PARTY
Entity and Nonentity
Entity Bundles Nonentity Bundles
ContractType Contracts (N) Only (%) Bundles (%) Only (%)
Supply 92 37.0% 52.1% 10.9%
Lease 89 91.0% 7.9% 1.1%
Total 181 63.5% 30.4% 6.1%
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Table 3 reports percentages of explicitly bundled-assignable contracts
that use entity-based and nonentity-based definitions of bundles with which
the contract may be assigned. The sample includes only those contracts that
are coded as explicitly bundled assignable, as reported in Table 2. A bundle
is defined as an entity bundle if assignment is permitted in the event of a
merger, acquisition, or a sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the
debtor party to the contract. A bundle is defined as a nonentity bundle if as-
signment is permitted with (a) specific asset(s) and/or contract(s), or (b) a
general definition of a bundle that does not specifically reference the debtor
entity, such as "business" or "segment."
APPENDIX C:
EXAMPLE OF EXPLICIT BUNDLED-ASSIGNABILITY CLAUSE
The following assignment clause is taken from a supply contract be-
tween Ascent Solar Technologies, Inc. and TurtleEnergy, LLC regarding the
supply of solar panels by Ascent Solar to TurtleEnergy: 74
17. Assignment
17.1 Except as provided herein, no party shall assign this Agreement without the prior
written consent of the other party hereto, and any purported assignment without such
consent shall be deemed null and void.
17.2 Notwithstanding the foregoing, both parties shall be permitted to assign this
Agreement in connection with a merger or sale of all or substantially all of their assets.
17.3 Buyer may assign a Purchase Order under this Agreement in favor of a third party
before acceptance of the Purchase Order by Ascent subject to Ascent's prior written
consent and payment by Buyer or the assignee of the price of the PV Modules before
shipping.
74. Ascent Solar Techs. Inc., Photovoltaic Module Supply Agreement (Ex. 10.1) (Sept.
23, 2009).
[Vol. 111:715
